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Abstract
Sponsored content advertising, also known as native advertising, is a new ad format in
which a brand’s content takes the same form and qualities of the publisher’s original content.
While many advertisers have largely embraced this new advertising format, consumers seem
to react negatively towards sponsored content ads. In this paper, we present an analytical
model that studies the strategic role of sponsored content advertising in a two-sided media
market. We identify conditions under which competing platforms would choose sponsored
content advertising over traditional advertising. Despite consumers’ negative sentiment to-
wards sponsored content ads, they can be better off together with the advertisers when both
platforms choose this ad format. In fact, we show that a certain degree of consumer dislik-
ing is necessary to make both advertisers and consumers better off with sponsored content
ads. However, both competing platforms offering sponsored content ads may also result in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma equilibrium outcome generating sub-optimal profits. We further show
that two symmetric media platforms can choose different advertising strategies, leading to
an asymmetric equilibrium outcome. Lastly, we analyze how the presence of multi-homing
advertisers as well as an incomplete ad market coverage would affect the sponsored content ad
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
According to the American Press Institute, sponsored content advertising (often also referred to
as native advertising) is defined as a type of advertising where a brand’s content takes “the same
form and qualities of a publisher’s original content.” The definition here refers to an advertising
platform like the New York Times or BuzzFeed as the “publisher.”1 The definition also suggests
that this content can provide useful information to readers so that their perception about the
sponsored brand tends to be more favorable. While some forms of sponsored content advertising
(e.g., advertorial) have been there for more than a hundred years, recent innovations in digital
media have expanded the scopes of sponsored content advertising. With more primitive forms
of sponsored content advertising, consumers were always urged to take concrete actions. The
contemporary version of sponsored content advertising, however, never asks a consumer to buy
a product. Instead, it portrays a favorable picture of the corresponding brand. As a result, the
content looks more convincing and authentic, as if the publishing platform itself has developed
the material, instead of the brand.
Take for example the article “Women Inmates: Why the Male Model Doesn’t Work” which
was published in the New York Times.2 The article discussed the incarceration experience of the
female inmates in the U.S. prisons. The write-up offered an in-depth analysis of the challenges that
the female inmates experienced, and also provided some insights on how to improve the quality
of life of the women convicts. At a first glance, it may seem like an example of a typical first-class
journalism that any reader of NYT would expect to see. However, upon careful examination of the
article, a reader would find that the article was a paid post. The advertiser/sponsor of this article
was Netflix. Even though in the entire article there was no reference of either the brand (Netflix)
or any product (i.e., the Netflix TV shows), any reader interested in contemporary television
culture would realize that the article was subtly used to raise interest and awareness of Netflix’s
original series “Orange Is the New Black.” This particular web TV series produced by Netflix
was based on a real life woman inmate’s experiences in a minimum security federal prison.
From an advertiser’s perspective, the development of the sponsored content advertising sounds
quite promising, but at the same time it can have a negative impact. In particular, although
sometimes readers may accept sponsored content as useful and relevant as any other editorial
content, a recognition of sponsored content advertising as a mere promotional message could make
1https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/white-papers/the-definition-of-sponsored-content/
2https://www.nytimes.com/paidpost/netflix/women-inmates-separate-but-not-equal.html
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the readers more upset (Wojdynski and Evans 2016). If for whatever reason readers identify an
editorial-like product review as a brand’s promotional message, they may feel that the brand
has tried to mislead them. Of course, one simple way brands can alleviate this problem is to
clearly label the content as the promotional material. In reality though, many brands do not
take such actions fearing that a clear labeling would transform the sponsored content advertising
back into traditional advertising (equivalent to banner advertising) and thus the whole purpose
of developing sponsored content advertising will not be served.
A 2015 survey undertaken by a content marketing platform shows that across different plat-
forms, about sixty percent of the readers on average fail to identify a sponsored content article
as a promotional activity of a brand (they believe that the article was written by the staff re-
porters of the publishing platform). This survey also shows that about forty eight percent of these
readers felt deceived once they were told that the article was an example of sponsored content
advertising.3 Since then, the Federal Trade Commission echoed consumers’ concerns by imposing
a set of regulations on sponsored content ads, particularly by taking stricter stands regarding
the disclosure and labeling policy.4 Given the current regulation, in this paper we consider spon-
sored content ads as another ad format which can be effective and annoying at the same time.
We essentially look at the use of different advertising formats with differential effectiveness and
differential nuisance. As a result, our model can be suitably used (with necessary modifications)
to understand how other advertising formats such as click bait may end up as an equilibrium
strategy of a media platform.
A publishing platform too may lose credibility once its readers realize that the editorial-
like article is neither relevant nor well integrated with the actual editorial content. The Netflix
sponsored content on women inmates for example had received a lot of positive attention because
of the high quality of the ad content. Moreover, the sponsored content was well integrated with
the New York Times’ other editorial content and successfully replicated NYT’s journalistic style.5
If the content is not well developed or well integrated, consumers may decide to stop visiting the
platform or visit it less frequently. In a two-sided market, this decision may affect a platform
in two ways. The first one comes as a direct effect for the platform which charges a price to its
readers for accessing news content - the lower the number of visitors is, the lower the gross revenue
of the platform will be (from readers’ side). Additionally, if only a handful of consumers visit the
3https://contently.com/strategist/2015/09/08/article-or-ad-when-it-comes-to-native-no-one-knows/
4https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-advertising-guide-businesses
5https://digiday.com/media/new-york-times-native-ad-thats-winning-skeptics/
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platform, even the advertisers will not be happy. In that case, a platform may lose a substantial
number of advertisers too, which will further reduce this platform’s revenue. This potential threat,
however, does not necessarily dampen the spirit of either advertisers or publishing platforms in
developing sponsored content advertisements. According to eMarketer (2019), online advertisers
spent $35 billion on native ads in 2018 and $44 billion in 2019, with a projected $53 billion being
spent in 2020.6 Furthermore, data from the Native Advertising Institute, shows that revenue
generation from native advertising is expected to increase by 46% by 2021.7
In a recent article, Forbes has identified competition, transparency, and content creation as
three most crucial factors in the context of sponsored content advertising.8 The article also men-
tions that the names of the sponsored content ad products (such as BrandSpeak, BrandConnect,
BrandPost, etc.) are “maddeningly similar” and often leave the audience confused about the real
intentions of the platforms. This article suggests that as competition for ad dollars has become
rife, the platforms are still learning how to adopt effective advertising strategies.
To sum up, given the different views among consumers, advertisers and platforms surrounding
sponsored content advertising, this paper investigates how directionally opposite key driving forces
such as consumers’ ad annoyance and advertisers’ benefit from more convincing storytelling shape
the advertising format strategies of media platforms. Specifically, we seek to answer the following
research questions in this paper. First, when should a media platform adopt sponsored content
advertising instead of traditional advertising? Second, is sponsored content advertising necessarily
more profitable for a media platform than traditional advertising? Third, can sponsored content
advertising offer a higher surplus to both consumers and advertisers in spite of a higher degree
of consumer annoyance? To answer the first question, we characterize the complete equilibrium
conditions for two competing platforms as well as a monopoly platform. For the second question,
we provide conditions under which sponsored content advertising as an equilibrium strategy can
lead to lower payoffs for the platform (i.e., we show the existence of the prisoner’s dilemma
outcome). Lastly, to address the third question, we present conditions under which, in contrast
to conventional wisdom, both advertisers and consumers can be better off in the presence of
sponsored content advertising.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows: in the next section we present the literature
6https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-native-advertising-2019
7https://smartyads.com/blog/native-advertising-news-and-trends/
8https://www.forbes.com/sites/lewisdvorkin/2014/03/25/inside-forbes-10-battlegrounds-to-watch-as-
native-advertising-marches-on/#428c227640d8
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review. In Section 3, we explain our model. Following that, we discuss equilibrium results in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 offers two extensions of our main model. In Section 6 we discuss the managerial
implications and draw our concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Literature Review
Since sponsored content advertising is a recent phenomenon, the academic research on this topic is
currently at a nascent stage. Early papers on sponsored content advertising such as Becker-Olsen
(2003) have experimentally identified the benefits of sponsored content ads for the advertisers
as well as the platform. Becker-Olsen (2003) also explains how the informational context in
sponsored content ads forces the consumers to engage in higher levels of information processing,
and in turn affects a consumer’s attitude towards advertising in general. Campbell and Marks
(2015) and Conill (2016) qualitatively discuss the pros and cons of this new ad format in digital
advertising, while Bakshi (2015) explains why and how to regulate native advertising in online
news publications. Furthermore, Carlson (2015) provides a balanced critique of sponsored content
advertising and explains how this new form of ads may be eroding the boundaries between editorial
and advertising, and changing the normative understandings of journalistic autonomy.
Recent experimental studies such as Wojdynski and Evans (2016) also suggest that while a
higher transparency level helps consumers identify the message as an advertisement, most of the
time this ad recognition leads to negative evaluations. Lee, Kim and Ham (2016) alternatively
suggests that if consumers have strong information-seeking motivation (as opposed to socializing
motivation), then they would positively evaluate sponsored content advertising. In accordance
with Lee et al. (2006), we also find that when consumers obtain intrinsic value from the content
of the ad, sponsored content ads would become a more appealing format for the platforms. Most
recently, field experiments have been used to study the impact of native ads. For example,
Sahni and Nair (2020) varies the format of the ads and randomly assigns consumers into two
extreme conditions, one with no indication of the sponsored nature of the ads, and the other
with a clear disclosure of its sponsored nature. Empirically, they find that native ads benefit
advertisers and detect no evidence of deception under typical formats of disclosure used in the
paid-search marketplace. Combining clickstream, eye-tracking and survey data, Aribarg and
Schwartz (2020) uses online and field experiments to study consumers’ response to native ads
versus display ads under different native ad disclosures. They find that a native ad generates a
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higher click-through rate due to its resemblance of the editorial content, but a display ad can
garner more attention. Unlike these empirical studies that focus on a monopoly platform with
different disclosure strategies, we focus on the strategic impact of sponsored content ads and
explicitly model competition between media platforms. As a result, we can characterize the
optimal ad prices under competition and assess the impact of varying advertiser demand on the
equilibrium outcomes.
We follow the basic tenets of the two-sided market model with network effects laid out in the
seminal papers such as Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006). Rochet and Tirole (2003)
provides a general framework of a two-sided market by illustrating that any market with network
externalities can be considered as a two-sided market as long as a platform can effectively cross-
subsidize between different user groups. Armstrong (2006) on the other hand offers the primary
structure of a two-sided market where at least one group of economic agents opt for single-
homing (i.e., they only choose one platform). We assume that both readers and advertisers choose
single-homing in the main model, and then relax the assumption of single-homing and examine a
situation when advertisers can multi-home (i.e., they can purchase from both platforms).
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) that analyzes the role of consumers’ expectations and
network externalities, we assume that rational consumers’ and rational advertisers’ expectations
are both correct in equilibrium. More recent papers like Ellison and Ellison (2005) as well as
Tucker and Zhang (2010) suggest that almost all online markets show strong evidence of network
externalities. Tucker and Zhang (2010) specifically finds that online retail websites may get more
seller listings if a large number of sellers are already listed on the websites because that implies
a larger buyer base. In comparison, our paper has incorporated the opposite externalities across
the two sides of the market (advertisers prefer consumers while consumers dislike ads), which is
more consistent with the context of the media market. Furthermore, Chen and Xie (2007) finds
that due to cross-market network effects, an important factor like customer loyalty in one market
may actually reduce the profit in a secondary market when the two markets are interdependent.
By contrast, we show that even when consumers’ disutility towards sponsored content ads is
higher than their disutility towards traditional ads, due to cross-side externalities, consumers
may actually be better off under sponsored content advertising.
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on media markets. Several recent papers
on media markets have shown that mere competition among platforms may not necessarily make
consumers better off. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) finds that competing media stations can offer
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exclusivity rights to advertisers, thus yielding more poorly informed consumers and alleviating
price competition in the product market. On a related note, Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) shows that
competing platforms can offer minimally differentiated content which lowers the amount of ads
and helps advertisers gain higher margins from product sales to consumers. Anderson and Coate
(2005) shows that equilibrium advertising levels may be too low or too high depending on the
nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of competing platforms’ programs, and the benefits
to advertisers from reaching the viewers. Godes, Ofek and Sarvary (2009) suggests that duopoly
media firms can set higher prices for the media content than a monopolist firm. Zhu and Dukes
(2015) also finds that in regard to consumption of the factual content, consumers may not benefit
from the competition among media producers. Media platforms in our paper compete on the
ad format strategy, however such competition can increase the welfare of consumers even when
they face a more undesirable ad format. Amaldoss, Du and Shin (2016) finds that consumers’
heterogeneity in their aversion towards ads can lead symmetric platforms to adopt asymmetric
pricing strategies. In general, our paper differs from this stream of research by focusing on
the comparison between two advertising formats and analyzing how the cross-side externalities
influence the equilibrium ad choice and pricing.
3 Model
3.1 Platforms
Two competing platforms, 1 and 2, are horizontally differentiated and located on the two extremes
of each of the two Hotelling lines (faced by the readers (henceforth consumers) and the advertisers,
respectively). Each platform offers media content to the consumers and allow advertisers to
post either traditional ads, denoted by T (traditional advertisements) or sponsored content ads,
denoted by S (sponsored content/native advertisements). A traditional ad can be perceived
as a banner ad as the consumers instantaneously recognize it as a direct promotional message.
However, a sponsored content ad may provide high-quality content and may be well integrated
with other media content by the platform, and thus can potentially provide informational or
entertainment value to a consumer.
Platform i (i ∈ {1, 2}) charges prices, pυωiC and pυωiA , to the consumers and the advertisers,
respectively. Subscripts C and A denote consumers and advertisers, whereas superscripts υ and
ω represent the advertising strategies of platform 1 and platform 2, respectively. A platform has
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three decision variables – price for the consumers, price for the advertisers, and the ad type (i.e.,
whether to adopt traditional ads or sponsored content ads). To focus on platforms’ advertising
choice and the strategic interaction between the platforms and both sides of the market, we
assume that each platform chooses only one advertising format. In addition, the marginal cost
of producing the media content or creating the advertising messages is 0. Thus, the profits of
platform i when platform 1 chooses ad format v and platform 2 chooses ad format w are given by
Πυωi = p
υω
iC x
υω
iC + p
υω
iAx
υω
iA , i ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
xυωiC and x
υω
iA are respectively consumers’ demand and advertisers’ demand for platform i. In the
main model, we assume that both markets for the consumers and for the advertisers are fully
covered.9 This structure is appealing because it allows one platform’s strategy on one side (say
platform 1’s price for consumers) to influence not only its own other side (platform 1’s demand
from advertisers), but also indirectly affect the demand of consumers and advertisers from platform
2. We later analyze the impact of an incompletely covered ad market in an extension in Section
5.2. The table below summarizes all available strategies and profits for the two platforms.
Table 1: Platforms’ Strategies and Profits
Platform 1 / Platform 2 Traditional Ad Sponsored Content Ad
Traditional Ad Case TT (ΠTT1 ,Π
TT
2 ) Case TS (Π
TS
1 ,Π
TS
2 )
Sponsored Content Ad Case ST (ΠST1 ,Π
ST
2 ) Case SS (Π
SS
1 ,Π
SS
2 )
3.2 Consumers
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line. We assume that the consumers
obtain an intrinsic utility u0 from consuming either platform’s media content. However, depending
on her location on the Hotelling line, a consumer may incur a mismatch cost tC per unit of
distance traveled (for example, the presentation style of the media content differs from that of her
most preferred style). Put differently, tC captures the strength of consumers’ brand preferences
towards the two platforms. Consistent with prior research on advertising in the media market
(e.g., Anderson and Gabszewicz 2006), we assume that advertisements are perceived as nuisance
and thus create negative externalities for consumers. In particular, γT captures the extent of
9We analyze the situation in which both sides of the market are incompletely covered in Appendix A.5. In this
case, a platform has monopoly power on both sides of the market.
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negative externalities to consumers when they see the traditional ads. When γT increases, a
consumer’s dislike for a traditional ad also increases. In case of traditional ads, a consumer’s
expected total amount of disutility is given by γTx
eT
iA (superscript e denotes the expected value,
T denotes traditional ads), where xeTiA is consumers’ expected total number of the ads on platform
i. Therefore, when platform i (of location li, where l1 = 0 and l2 = 1) adopts the traditional ads,
a consumer with the location xTiC obtains the following utility from this platform:
UTiC = u0 − tC |xTiC − li| − pTiC − γTxeTiA . (2)
Despite being a newer format, the logic of advertisement being a general nuisance would still
be applicable to sponsored content ads, and thus consumers would also experience a disutility.
Specifically, we assume that a consumer’s marginal disutility from seeing a sponsored content ad
is given by γS . In other words, γS captures the extent of negative externalities to consumers from
the sponsored content ads on a platform.
Unique to this newer advertising format is the additional impact of its “content.” In other
words, the actual content or even the format itself of sponsored content ads can have an additional
effect on consumers. To capture this unique aspect of sponsored content ads, we assume that
when a platform adopts this ad format, consumers receive an extra utility (or disutility) of uS .
On the one hand, uS can be positive, since sponsored content ads are much more engaging in
nature and often provide a compelling story and detailed information about the product. As
a result, consumers can derive utilities from the informational content of these ad messages.
Moreover, many consumers often share such sponsored content ads on social media because of their
entertainment value. The parameter uS can thus capture such additional entertainment values
which traditional ads fail to deliver. On the other hand, uS can also be negative as consumers may
initially mistakenly identify a sponsored content ad as an authentic piece of editorial content and
upon realization, this may cause significant annoyance to the consumers. To facilitate exposition,
in the following analysis, we do not distinguish between different drivers of uS , and simply refer
to uS as the impact of the content from sponsored content ads.
10
To summarize, when platform i (of location li) adopts the sponsored content ads, a consumer
10We want to highlight that the impact of its content on consumers, uS , is the total incremental value that is not
correlated with the number of sponsored content ads. It only depends on the current editorial team’s capabilities
and the collaboration between the platforms and the advertisers (in other words, it is determined by the current
technology). Anything that is correlated with each one of these sponsored content ads has already been factored
into the group externality parameter γS .
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with the location xSiC obtains the following expected utility (superscript e denotes the expected
value):
USiC = u0 + uS − tC |xSiC − li| − pSiC − γSxeSiA. (3)
To clearly delineate the impact of the cross-market externality parameters from the impact of the
content from sponsored content ads, we assume uS = 0 in the main model in Section 4.1. Later,
we analyze the impact of a non-zero uS in Section 4.2.
3.3 Advertisers
Similar to consumers, we assume that advertisers are also uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line
as the media platforms are horizontally differentiated from advertisers’ perspective. Advertisers’
transportation cost of per unit of distance is given by tA, which captures the strength of their
brand preferences towards the two platforms. Given our focus on the choice of ad format, this
paper considers tA as a simple parameter which captures the aspects of a match between an
advertiser and a platform that is independent of the viewer base. Specifically, we assume that
tA = 1. As in real life we see that a platform like the New York Times offers multimedia-based
ads whereas a platform like BuzzFeed offers ads in forms of online quizzes and top ten lists.
In this example, tA captures advertisers’ relative preferences between multimedia-based ads and
quiz-based ads.
We also assume that an advertiser gets a marginal utility of αT for each consumer’s exposure
to the traditional ad. In other words, an advertiser’s gross utility from displaying a traditional
ad on a platform with an expected number of xeTiC consumers is given by αTx
eT
iC . Therefore, when
platform i adopts the traditional ads, an advertiser with the location xTiA obtains the following
expected utility (the price this advertiser pays, pTiA, can be seen as the total payment for x
eT
iC
number of impressions.)
UTiA = αTx
eT
iC − |xTiA − li| − pTiA. (4)
In contrast, in case of a sponsored content ad, the advertiser obtains a marginal utility αS per
consumer exposure. As a result, an advertiser’s expected gross utility from displaying a sponsored
content ad on the platform with an expected number of xeSiC consumers is given by αSx
eS
iC . To
summarize, when platform i adopts sponsored content ads, an advertiser with the location xSiA
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obtains the following expected utility
USiA = αSx
eS
iC − |xSiA − li| − pSiA. (5)
3.4 Two-sided Market and Assumptions
The two-sidedness of the market has been defined in the early literature on two-sided platforms
(i.e., Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2006). The most important aspect of this two-sidedness
is the existence of the inter-group externalities. In our context, γT and γS capture the negative
externalities consumers experience with traditional ads and sponsored content ads, respectively.
On the other hand, αT and αS represent the positive externalities advertisers enjoy from the
presence of consumers, with traditional ads and sponsored content ads, respectively.
To focus on the impact of sponsored content ads on the competition between platforms, we
assume that either a consumer or an advertiser can choose only one platform. In other words, we
analyze the “single-homing” situation. Later we relax the assumption of single-homing advertisers
and examine how the results change when advertisers have the option of multi-homing.
To focus on the more interesting analysis in the single-homing case, we make the following
assumptions:
36tC − (2(αS + αT )− γS − γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT )) > max{3tC(6 + αS − αT )− (αS + αT − γT )
(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT )) > 0, 18tC − 3(γS − γT )− (αT − γS − γT )(2(αS + αT )− γS − γT ) > 0},
(6)
α¯S > αS > γS ,
11 and αT > γT , (7)
αS > αT , and γS > γT . (8)
The first assumption states that the two platforms are sufficiently horizontally differentiated from
consumers’ perspective, such that both platforms have a positive demand from both sides of the
market in all cases. The second assumption ensures that advertisers’ marginal utility from reaching
consumers is bounded from above but is greater than consumers’ marginal disutility of seeing an
ad. Otherwise, a media platform is unlikely to survive as an intermediary between consumers and
advertisers. Finally, based on the current industry knowledge discussed in Section 1, we assume
that the marginal impact of sponsored content ads (as compared to that of traditional ads) is
more beneficial for advertisers and more adverse for consumers, i.e., αS > αT and γS > γT .
11The threshold α¯S ensures non-negative prices and is given in Appendix A.1.
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The following table summarizes all the notations in our model.
Table 2: Parameter and Decision Variables
Symbol Definition
u0 Consumers’ intrinsic utility from accessing a platform
uS Impact of the content from sponsored content ads on consumers
γT Consumers’ marginal disutility towards a traditional ad
γS Consumers’ marginal disutility towards a sponsored content ad
αT Advertiser’s marginal utility from showing a traditional ad
αS Advertiser’s marginal utility from showing a sponsored content ad
tC Consumers’ transportation cost
tA Advertiser’s transportation cost, normalized to 1
T Traditional Advertising
S Sponsored Content Advertising
.e Expected value
pυωiC Consumer price by platform i (platform 1 adopts υ and platform 2 adopts ω), υ, ω ∈ {T, S}
xυωiC Consumer demand for platform i
pυωiA Advertiser price by platform i
xυωiA Advertiser demand for platform i
Finally, the timeline of the game is as follows. In stage 1, both platforms announce ad format
decisions simultaneously. In stage 2, the two platforms announce prices simultaneously after
observing each other’s ad format choices. Lastly in stage 3, both consumers and advertisers make
participation decisions, and payoffs are realized.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the competing platforms’ advertising and pricing decisions.12 To focus
on the impact of cross-side externalities, we first discuss the case when the content of sponsored
content ads does not have any additional impact on consumers, i.e., uS = 0, in Section 4.1. In
Section 4.2, we concentrate on the impact of sponsored content ads’ content alone, i.e., uS 6= 0,
on platforms’ choices of ad formats by assuming away the differential impact of the cross-side
externalities across the two ad types. Finally, in Section 4.3, we present the full model with
differing cross-side externalities and the presence of sponsored content ads’ content impact.
12Please see Appendix B.1 for the analysis of a monopoly platform. In this case, the impact of cross-side
externalities on the platform’s profits is similar to that under the case of duopoly, but the impact of the content of
sponsored content ads on profitability is different.
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4.1 Impact of Cross-Side Externalities
When competing for consumers and advertisers, both platforms take into account the impact of
all cross-side externalities. Each platform first decides the ad format, and then chooses the prices
for its consumers and advertisers. As shown in Table 1, there are three possible outcomes: SS,
TT, and TS (or ST). After solving the three subgames, we analyze whether and when each of
them is the equilibrium.
4.1.1 Both Platforms Offer Sponsored Content Ads (SS)
When both platforms offer sponsored content ads, platform 1’s demand from consumers and
advertisers are given by (those of platform 2’s are symmetrically defined)
xSS1C =
pSS2C − pSS1C + tC − γSxeSS1A + γSxeSS2A
2tC
, (9)
xSS1A =
pSS2A − pSS1A + 1 + αSxeSS1C − αSxeSS2C
2
. (10)
We see that platform 1’s demand from consumers decreases in its price, pSS1C , and in consumers’
expected number of ads, xeSS1A . However, the demand of platform 1 increases in platform 2’s price,
pSS2C , and in consumers’ expected number of ads on platform 2, x
eSS
2A . In this case, each platform’s
profit is given by ΠSSi = p
SS
iC x
SS
iC + p
SS
iA x
SS
iA , i ∈ {1, 2}.
With the assumption of rational expectations, xSSiC = x
eSS
iC and x
SS
iA = x
eSS
iA in equilibrium,
we obtain the following prices and profits when both platforms offer sponsored content ads after
solving their optimization problem:
pSS∗iC = tC − αS , 13 (11)
pSS∗iA = 1 + γS , (12)
ΠSS∗i =
1 + tC − αS + γS
2
. (13)
First, note that the price for consumers, pSS∗iC , decreases in advertisers’ marginal utility towards
consumers, αS . This occurs because when αS increases, consumers become more valuable to
advertisers in the presence of sponsored content ads. To capitalize on advertisers’ stronger desire
13When αS is larger than tC , readers have free access to the media content. Please see Appendix B.2 for the
analysis of the case of free content for consumers.
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to access consumers, platforms will reduce the price to attract more consumers.
By contrast, the price for advertisers, pSS∗iA , increases in consumers’ marginal disutility towards
sponsored content ads, γS . This result arises because as γS increases, consumers have less incentive
to go to a platform with sponsored content ads. To compensate for consumers’ lower willingness-
to-pay, the platforms charges higher advertising prices.
Importantly, despite consumers’ aversion towards ads, each platform’s profit increases in their
disutility from seeing the sponsored content ads,
∂ΠSS∗i
∂γS
> 0. By contrast, a platform’s profit
decreases in advertisers’ utility from reaching consumers,
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
< 0. This result occurs because
of the opposite cross-side externality in this context: The former raises advertisers’ prices to com-
pensate for consumers and the latter pushes down consumers’ prices to attract more advertisers.
More specifically, the marginal consumer trades off between buying from platform 1 and buying
from platform 2 (refer to Equation (9)). In other words, the negative impact on one platform’s
consumer demand from γS is alleviated by the number of advertisers on the other platform. When
the two competing platforms are symmetric, γS ’s negative impact on consumers can be completely
mitigated by raising the price for advertisers.
4.1.2 Both Platforms Offer Traditional Ads (TT)
Given the similarity between the two advertising formats, to avoid repetition, in this section
we briefly summarize the platforms’ demand, prices, and profits when both platforms choose
traditional ads. In this case, platform 1’s demand from consumers and advertisers are given by
(those of platform 2’s are symmetrically defined) xTT1C =
pTT2C −pTT1C +tC−γT xeTT1A +γT xeTT2A
2tC
, and xTT1A =
pTT2A −pTT1A +1+αT xeTT1C −αT xeTT2C
2 , respectively.
With the assumption of rational expectations, xTTiC = x
eTT
iC and x
TT
iA = x
eTT
iA in equilibrium,
we obtain the following prices and profits when both platforms offer traditional ads after solving
their optimization problem:
pTT∗iC = tC − αT , (14)
pTT∗iA = 1 + γT , (15)
ΠTT∗i =
1 + tC − αT + γT
2
. (16)
Comparing the case where both platforms offer traditional ads (TT) to the case where they
offer sponsored content ads (SS), we observe that consumers’ price is lower under sponsored
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content advertising, i.e., pSS∗iC < p
TT∗
iC . However, advertisers’ price for sponsored content ads is
higher than that for traditional ads, i.e., pSS∗iA > p
TT∗
iC . The result that advertisers would pay
higher prices for sponsored content ads is in accordance with the current industry practice.14
4.1.3 Asymmetric Advertising Strategies by the Platforms (TS)
When one platform (say platform 1) offers traditional ads and the other platform (platform 2)
offers sponsored content ads, platform 1’s demand from consumers and advertisers are given
by xTS1C =
pTS2C−pTS1C+tC−γT xeTS1A +γSxeTS2A
2tC
, and xTS1A =
pTS2A−pTS1A+1+αT xeTS1C −αSxeTS2C
2 . We can see that
platform 1’s demand from consumers decreases in its price, pTS1C , and consumers’ expected number
of ads on it, xeTS1A . It increases in platform 2’s price, p
TS
2C , and in consumers’ expected number of
ads on platform 2, xeTS2A . In this case, platform 1’s profit is given by Π
TS
1 = p
TS
1C x
TS
1C + p
TS
1Ax
TS
1A .
Platform 2’s demand and profit are similarly defined. Similar to the analysis before, with the
assumption of rational expectations, we obtain the equilibrium result in the case of TS (details
are given in Appendix A.1).
As long as the two platforms are sufficiently differentiated, platform 2 with sponsored content
ads certainly wants more participation from the advertisers’ side because those advertisers show a
more favorable attitude towards its ad format, αS > αT . To appeal to more lucrative advertisers,
platform 2 offers a lower price than platform 1 in order to attract more consumers, pTS∗2C < p
TS∗
1C .
By contrast, platform 1 focuses on extracting surplus from the consumers’ side and hence it
charges a lower price (compared to platform 2) for advertisers, pTS∗1A < p
TS∗
2A . To some extent, this
result has the flavor of “tacit collusion” between the two competing platforms that allows each
of them to focus on one side of the market. Overall, competition on multiple dimensions (price
and advertising) eventually leads to the directionally opposite effects on the pricing strategies of
the two platforms. Our first lemma states how the externality parameters affect the asymmetric
pricing strategies.
Lemma 1. When tC ≥ tC , as αS increases, both platforms decrease consumers’ prices. The
platform offering sponsored content advertising increases the ad price and the platform offering
traditional advertising decreases the ad price as αS increases.
15
When αS increases, sponsored content ads become more attractive for the advertisers. As
a result, the platform offering sponsored content ads reduces its consumers’ price to enhance
14See https://broadstreetads.com/price-sponsored-content/, and https://nativeadvertisinginstitute.com/blog/
sponsored-content-renewal-rates
15The threshold tC is given in Appendix A.1. Note that tC ≥ tC is a sufficient condition (used for simplifying
the analysis and enhancing the exposition), and even if it is not satisfied, this lemma can still hold.
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consumer demand and in turn to attract the more lucrative advertisers. The competitive pressure
for more consumers forces the platform with traditional ads to reduce its price too. On the other
hand, with a rise in αS , the platform with sponsored content ads would charge a higher ad price
because of advertisers’ stronger preference towards this ad format. By comparison, the relatively
less appealing ad format of traditional ads would force the platform with it to decrease its ad
price.
4.1.4 Equilibrium Outcome
After analyzing the three subgames, we next summarize the equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1. When αS > α1, both platforms offering traditional ads (TT) is the unique
equilibrium. When α1 > αS > α2, one platform offering traditional ads and the other platform
offering sponsored content ads (TS/ST) is the unique equilibrium. Lastly, when α2 > αS > 0,
both platforms offering sponsored content ads (SS) is the unique equilibrium.16
Proposition 1 shows that when advertisers’ marginal utility from showing a sponsored content
ad is relatively high, both platforms offering traditional ads is the unique equilibrium outcome.
This seemingly counter-intuitive result takes place due to the two-sidedness of the market. As
advertisers obtain a higher marginal utility from sponsored content ads, they prefer the platform
which adopts this ad format. As more advertisers show up, this platform charges a lower price to
the consumers to offset the effect of negative externality of advertising. When αS is sufficiently
high, i.e., αS > α1, the price for consumers is so low that the platform with sponsored content
ads cannot be adequately compensated with any gains from the advertiser’s side. As a result,
both platforms offer traditional ads (TT) in this case.
As αS decreases, a platform (say platform 2) may contemplate offering sponsored content ads
because after this deviation, it can charge a lower price to its consumers (compared to the case of
TT): pTS∗2C < p
TT∗
2C . The reduced price conditionally leads to a great consumer demand, which in
turn allows platform 2 to capitalize on advertisers’ higher willingness to pay for sponsored content
ads. In this scenario, the deviation from T to S makes platform 2 better off. At the same time,
platform 1 is satisfied with traditional ads because it can now further raise its consumer price
(based on Lemma 1) as αS decreases to focus on revenues from the consumer side. In particular,
when advertisers’ marginal utility from sponsored content ads is moderate, i.e., α1 > αS > α2,
16The thresholds, α1 and α2, are defined in Appendix A.1. In Corollary 1 we analyze the case when α2 > α1.
Note that due to the assumption in Equation (8), when αT > max{α1, α2}, both platforms offering traditional ads
is the unique equilibrium.
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platform 2 that shifts to S will charge a lower consumer price and a higher advertiser price
compared to platform 1 with T, resulting in a situation where each platform focuses on revenues
from one side of the market. Thus within this parameter range, two symmetric platforms end
up adopting asymmetric ad strategies in equilibrium. As αS decreases further, the non-deviating
platform 1 on the other hand experiences a sharp decline in its profit because its revenue from the
consumer side cannot offset the potential loss from the ad side through not choosing advertisers’
preferred ad format, and thus this platform eventually starts to offer the sponsored content ads
when αS < α2, leading to the SS equilibrium.
As shown in the appendix, it is also possible to have α2 > α1. Our next corollary summarizes
how the equilibrium outcome changes if the above condition holds.
Corollary 1. When αS > α2, TT is the unique equilibrium. When α2 > αS > α1, there exist
two equilibria: TT and SS. When α1 > αS > 0, SS is the unique equilibrium.
Identical to Proposition 1, when αS is sufficiently high (low), TT (SS) is the unique equilibrium
outcome. When αS is moderately high, the tradeoff between a lower consumer price and a higher
advertiser price versus a higher consumer price and a lower advertiser price can also lead to the
possibility of multiple symmetric strategy equilibria. Thus, in this range both TT and SS can
occur as equilibrium outcomes. Notice that when (γS − γT ) > (αS − αT ), SS equilibrium is the
more profitable one. In this case, it is up to the platforms to coordinate in order to achieve a
mutually beneficial outcome.
Lastly, we find that the equilibrium conditions in terms of γS are exactly opposite to the
equilibrium conditions in terms of αS (Details are given in Appendix A.1). In other words,
for higher values of γS , SS becomes the equilibrium; whereas TT is the equilibrium when γS
is relatively low. Intuitively, as γS increases, platforms charge higher prices to the advertisers.
When γS is sufficiently high, the benefit from offering sponsored content ads (through a higher
ad price) is significantly greater than the cost of offering sponsored content ads (through a lower
consumer price), and thus SS becomes the equilibrium. On the other hand, when γS is sufficiently
low, the marginal revenue from the advertiser side for sponsored content ads cannot negate the
loss from the consumer side. Thus, TT becomes the equilibrium.
Focusing on the parameter range where SS is the unique equilibrium discussed in Proposition
1 and Corollary 1, we next discuss whether the sponsored content advertising necessarily makes
both platforms better off compared to the traditional advertising.
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Proposition 2. When (γS − γT ) < (αS − αT ), both platforms offering sponsored content adver-
tising is a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome.
Although the popularity of sponsored content advertising has grown in the past few years, this
proposition shows that both platforms adopting this format can in fact be a Prisoner’s Dilemma
outcome. In particular, when consumers’ additional disutility from sponsored content ads com-
pared to traditional ads, (γS − γT ), is lower than advertisers’ additional utility from sponsored
content ads compared to traditional ads, (αS − αT ), the SS equilibrium in the competitive two-
sided media market will boil down to a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Ironically, even if advertisers strongly prefer sponsored content ads to traditional ads (i.e., a
higher advertiser utility under SS, USS∗A > U
TT∗
A ), the resulting condition (αS−αT ) > 2(γS−γT )
shows that the two competing platforms still would have been better off if they had both chosen
traditional ads since ΠSS∗i < Π
TT∗
i . The intuition is explained in two steps as follows. First, note
that the price for consumers is lower when both platforms offer sponsored content ads: pSS∗iC <
pTT∗iC . However, this is not necessarily because consumers dislike sponsored content ads more than
they dislike the traditional ads. Instead, price is lower for consumers because advertisers prefer
sponsored content ads to traditional ads. Advertisers’ stronger preference towards sponsored
content ads gives platforms a stronger incentive to cut prices for consumers to better capitalize
on advertisers. This is unique to the context of the two-sided media market. Given that the price
for advertisers in SS, pSS∗iA = 1 + γS , is not significantly higher than that in TT, p
TT∗
iA = 1 + γT ,
i.e., pSS∗iA − pTT∗iA < pTT∗iC − pSS∗iC , the two platforms’ profits are lower when they choose sponsored
content ads compared to traditional ads: ΠSS∗i < Π
TT∗
i .
Second, suppose both platforms are offering traditional ads now. By unilaterally deviating to
sponsored content ads, one platform can lower its price for consumers and gain a bigger market
share on this side of the market. As a result, this focal platform becomes more appealing to
advertisers for two reasons: more consumers and a more attractive advertising format (recall
sponsored content ads are strongly preferred by advertisers when (αS − αT ) > 2(γS − γT )).
Therefore, this platform can raise its price for advertisers and improve its total profits. By a
similar logic, the other platform has incentives to follow suit by shifting to sponsored content ads
and cut prices for consumers as well. This eventually leads to the Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome
in which both platforms offer sponsored content ads even if offering traditional ads is a more
profitable outcome.
Managerially, the condition (γS − γT ) < (αS − αT ) is more likely to hold when the sponsored
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content ads are better integrated with the context of their surrounding editorials/news coverage,
and the platform’s transparency is high such that sponsored content ads are clearly disclosed to
avoid consumers’ confusion. One prominent example would be “T Brand Studio” launched by
the New York Times as its native ad shop, with the specific objective of working with advertisers
to craft brand stories which would be impactful as well as engaging for the consumers.17 The
success of “T brand studio” suggests that the net impact of sponsored content advertising can be
substantially higher than that of traditional advertising. However, Proposition 2 cautions platform
managers to account for the competitive environment when investing in sponsored content ads to
improve αS and reduce γS .
After comparing platforms’ profitabilities between the two advertising formats, the natural
question is whether consumers and advertisers are better off with sponsored content ads compared
to traditional ads. We answer this question and summarize the welfare implications in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3. When both platforms offer sponsored content advertising,
1. consumers are better off when γS ≤ γ1 = γT + 2(αS − αT );
2. advertisers are better off when γS ≤ γ2 = γT + (αS−αT )2 .
At first blush, it may seem that when consumers dislike sponsored content ads more than they
dislike traditional ads (γS > γT ), they should be worse off when platforms offer sponsored content
ads in equilibrium. However, the first part of Proposition 3 states otherwise as long as consumers’
marginal disutility towards sponsored content ads is not excessively high, i.e., when γS ≤ γ1. This
seemingly counter-intuitive result arises because of the following reasons. First, recall from the
earlier discussion, the price for consumers is lower when both platforms offer sponsored content
ads: pSS∗iC < p
TT∗
iC , because now the platforms have stronger incentives to extract more surplus
from the advertisers who prefer this ad format. Second, in the SS equilibrium, consumers are not
exposed to more ads compared to the situation of the traditional ads. In fact, the number of ads
appearing on each platform stays the same across the two advertising formats: xSS∗iA = x
TT∗
iA = 1/2.
Third, consumers’ disutility from the traditional ads γT can be relatively high (which perhaps
explains why a substantial number of consumers these days use technologies such as “ad-blocker”).
The combination of the three reasons leads to a welfare increase for consumers when γS ≤ γ1.
The second part of Proposition 3 states that advertisers are also better off in the presence of
sponsored content ads, as long as consumers’ disutility towards this ad format does not exceed
17See https://www.tbrandstudio.com/.
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their disutility towards traditional ads by too much. This result can be better understood by
comparing the utility of an advertiser located at xA across the two advertising formats: U
SS
iA =
αSx
eSS
iC −|xA−li|−pSSiA and UTTiA = αTxeTTiC −|xA−li|−pTTiA . On the one hand, this advertiser enjoys
a higher utility from accessing the same amount of consumers (recall in both equilibria consumers’
demand is 1/2): αSx
eSS∗
iC > αTx
eTT∗
iC . On the other hand, because consumers dislike sponsored
content ads more, the platforms have to adjust advertisers’ price accordingly: pSS∗iA = 1 + γS ,
which increases in γS . When consumers’ disutility towards sponsored content ads is below a
threshold, i.e., when γS < γ2 = γT +
(αS−αT )
2 , advertisers’ benefit of exposing consumers to
sponsored content ads outweighs the price they have to pay. Therefore, advertisers are overall
better off with sponsored content ads.
It is worth pointing out that consumers are more likely to be better off than advertisers in the
presence of sponsored content ads (because γ1 > γ2). In other words, when platforms shift from
traditional ads to sponsored content ads and γ2 < γS < γ1, consumers are better off but advertisers
are worse off. Again this happens because advertisers have to pay to indirectly compensate for
consumers’ disutility towards sponsored content ads, pSS∗iA = 1 + γS , whereas consumers enjoy a
lower price with this ad format, pSS∗iC < p
TT∗
iC .
4.2 Impact of Content from Sponsored Content Ads
Recall that when platform i adopts the sponsored content ads, a consumer located at xSiC obtains
the expected utility of
USiC = u0 + uS − tC |xSiC − li| − pSiC − γSxeSiA.
In particular, uS captures the impact of the “content” from sponsored content ads that does
not depend on ad volume (as long as there are ads on the platform, xeSiA > 0). When uS > 0,
sponsored content ads bring consumers some positive informational or entertainment value. By
contrast, when uS < 0, sponsored content ads bring consumers some additional disutility, possibly
due to the poor integration with the surrounding editorial content of the platform. We assume
that |uS | < u∗, such that the absolute impact from the content of sponsored content ads is not
excessively high and the cross-side externality parameters are still relevant.18
To focus on the strategic impact of the cross-market externality parameters, we assumed uS
18The value of u∗ is given in Appendix A.2.
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to be zero in Section 4.1. In this subsection, we consider the case where uS is non-zero. In order
to assess the sole impact of uS on the equilibrium advertising strategies, we keep the ad format
specific externality parameters the same. In other words, we make the simplifying assumption
that αT = αS and γT = γS to delineate the effect of uS . Other aspects of the model remain the
same as the previous model in Section 4.1. Since the two ad formats now do not differ in terms
of the externality parameters, the resulting prices and profits under the symmetric equilibrium
strategies SS and TT become identical, the same as those given in Equations (11), (12), and (13).
Interestingly, even if the content from sponsored content ads has a significant impact on
consumers, i.e., when the magnitude of uS is high, it does not affect the optimal pricing or profits
in the case of SS due to the competitive pressure. However, uS does influence the prices and
profits of the two platforms when they adopt asymmetric ad strategies (platform 1 with T and
platform 2 with S):
pTS∗1C = tC − αS −
uS(3tS − αS(αS − 2γS))
9tC − 2α2S + 5αSγS − 2γ2S
, (17)
pTS∗1A = 1 + γS −
uS(αS + γS)
9tC − (αS − 2γS)(2αS − γS) , (18)
pTS∗2C = tC − αS +
uS(3tS − αS(αS − 2γS))
9tC − 2α2S + 5αSγS − 2γ2S
, (19)
pTS∗2A = 1 + γT +
uS(αS + γS)
9tC − (αS − 2γS)(2αS − γS) , (20)
ΠTS∗1 =
1
2
(1 + tC − uS − αS + γS + uS(uS + 3tC + αS − α
2
S + γS + 2αSγS)
9tC − 2α2S + 5αSγS − 2γ2S
), (21)
ΠTS∗2 =
1
2
(1 + tC + uS − αS + γS + uS(uS − 3tC − αS + α
2
S − γS − 2αSγS)
9tC − 2α2S + 5αSγS − 2γ2S
). (22)
First, we observe that with a positive uS , the profit of the platform with sponsored content ads
when its rival adopts traditional ads increases in uS , i.e.,
∂ΠTS∗2
∂uS
> 0. In fact, even the platform
with traditional ads can be better off as uS increases, i.e.,
∂ΠTS∗1
∂uS
> 0 under some conditions.19 The
intuition is that holding constant γS , a higher positive uS decreases consumers’ overall disutility
towards sponsored content ads. As a result, the platform with sponsored content ads can increase
its price for consumers, and still maintain a higher ad price than its rival.
After analyzing all three subgames, we find that when uS > 0, adopting sponsored content
ads is a strictly dominant strategy for both platforms. Intuitively, a positive uS means that
overall, sponsored content ads are less undesirable for consumers. As a result, both platforms
19The result
∂ΠTS∗1
∂uS
> 0 holds when 2uS > u
∗. Thus, when uS is very small, the impact of uS on ΠTS∗1 is negative.
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have incentives to switch to this ad format, due to advertisers’ stronger preference towards it.
Consequently, SS is the unique equilibrium. Managerially, this result highlights the importance
of the high-quality content production and integration of the sponsored content ads. Through
a similar logic, when uS < 0, adopting traditional ads is a strictly dominant strategy for both
platforms. No asymmetric equilibrium takes place in this scenario. Furthermore, there is no
prisoner’s dilemma outcome any more, since the platform’s profits under the two different ad
formats are identical. The last result is important, because it implies that the prisoner’s dilemma
outcome between the two competing platforms is completely driven by the differential cross-side
externalities.
4.3 Total Impact of Sponsored Content Ads
After separately assessing the impact of cross-side externalities in Section 4.1 and the content
impact from sponsored content ads in Section 4.2, we now analyze the combined impact of a
non-zero uS and different externality parameters for different ad formats.
Our analysis shows that qualitatively the equilibrium outcomes remain the same as those
presented in Proposition 1. For higher values of αS (i.e., when sponsored content ads are more
appealing to advertisers), TT will be the equilibrium. For lower values of αS (i.e., when sponsored
content ads are less appealing to advertisers), SS will be the equilibrium. When αS is in the
intermediate range, either the asymmetric equilibrium or multiple equilibria take place.
Due to the complexity of the analysis, we cannot directly compare the cutoff values of αS that
determine the equilibrium outcomes with their counterparts in Proposition 1.20 Numerically,
we find that SS is more likely to occur when uS > 0. Similarly, TT is more likely to occur
when uS < 0. The asymmetric equilibrium is more likely to arise when |uS | decreases, holding
everything else constant. Furthermore, SS being the prisoner’s dilemma equilibrium is more
likely to occur when uS > 0. Technically, the condition for the prisoner’s dilemma remains the
same, i.e., (γS − γT ) < (αS − αT ). Therefore, when the equilibrium threshold α2 increases with
uS > 0, SS is more likely to occur, implying that the prisoner’s dilemma is a more likely outcome.
Ironically, this result highlights the managerial nuances faced by the competing platforms: Even
if advertisers strongly prefer sponsored content ads (a relatively high αS) and the quality of these
ads are high so that consumers enjoy their content (a positive uS), both platforms may still be
more likely to end up being worse off. To clearly assess the implications of sponsored content
20The cutoff values in this subsection are presented in Appendix A.3.
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ads for the platforms, managers need to fully account for the characteristics of the different ad
formats, consumers’ ad aversion, and the competitive environment.
Notably, the results from Proposition 3 remain completely unchanged in this comprehensive
model. In other words, despite consumers’ greater aversion towards sponsored content ads com-
pared to traditional ads, both consumers and advertisers can still be better off when two competing
platforms adopt sponsored content ads. This happens as long as consumers’ marginal disutility
towards sponsored content ads is not excessively high.
5 Extensions
In Section 4, we analyzed the competing platforms’ equilibrium advertising formats under the
assumption of single-homing and complete market coverage on both the consumer side as well
as the advertiser side. In this section, we consider two alternative assumptions and study their
impact on the equilibrium outcomes.
5.1 Multi-homing Advertisers
In this section, we relax the assumption of advertisers single-homing on a media platform. Instead,
we allow advertisers to purchase from both platforms while consumers continue to single-home.
We will later see that in equilibrium, not every advertiser will endogenously choose to multi-home.
Typically, the advertisers who are located (on the advertisers’ Hotelling line) relatively close to
one of the media platforms do not find multi-homing appealing since their relative preference for
the other platform is very low. The utility function of an advertiser who chooses single-homing
will remain the same as Equations (4) and (5). The utility function of a multi-homing advertiser
is given below
UυωA = αυx
eυ
iC + αωx
eω
jC − (1 + pυiA + pωjA), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, υ, ω ∈ {S, T}; (23)
where xeυiC and x
eω
jC denote expected consumer demand for platforms i and j, respectively, and
xeυiC + x
eω
jC = 1. On the other hand, consumers’ utility functions change into the following
UTiC = u0 − tC |xTiC − li| − pTiC − γT (xeMA + xeTiA ), (24)
USiC = u0 − tC |xSiC − li| − pSiC − γS(xeMA + xeSiA), 21 (25)
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where xeMA (x
eυ
iA and x
eω
jA) denotes the expected number of advertisers who multi-home (single-
home on i and j), and thus xeυiA + x
eω
jA + x
eM
A = 1.
Platform i’s profit function is given below
Πυωi = p
υω
iC x
υω
iC + p
υω
iA (x
υω
iA + x
υωM
A ), i ∈ {1, 2}, (26)
where platform 1 pursues ad format υ, and platform 2 opts for ad format ω. To facilitate exposi-
tion, below we present the prices for consumers and advertisers and the profits of the platforms
in the case of SS (where superscript “M” denotes the case of multi-homing). The optimal prices
and profits in other subgames are presented in Appendix A.4.
pSS∗,MiC =
4tC − αS(αS − 3γS)
4
, (27)
pSS∗,MiA =
(αS + γS)
4
, (28)
ΠSS∗,Mi =
8tC − α2S + 6αSγS − γ2S
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. (29)
After analyzing all subgames, we characterize the equilibrium conditions as follows. When
αS > max{αSa, αSb} and αT < min{αTa, αTb}, TT is the unique equilibrium. When αS <
min{αSa, αSb} and αT > max{αTa, αTb}, SS is the unique equilibrium. When αSb < αS < αSa
and αTa < αT < αTb, asymmetric equilibrium TS/ST occurs. Finally, when αSa < αS < αSb and
αTb < αT < αTa, multiple equilibria arise where both SS and TT are equilibria.
22 Similar to the
single-homing case in Section 4.1, when αS is relatively high, TT is the unique equilibrium and
when αS is relatively low, SS becomes the unique equilibrium.
One important question is how different parties fare once advertisers multi-home compared
to the benchmark case where advertisers single-home. Given our focus on sponsored content ads,
we answer this question in the SS equilibrium in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When both platforms offer sponsored content ads, comparing the case of advertiser
multi-homing to the case of advertiser single-homing,
1. consumers are worse off;
2. advertisers are better off;
3. platforms are better off.
21For the sake of comparative discussion, we assume uS = 0 as it is in the main model.
22Please see Appendix A.4 for more details.
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Intuitively, once advertisers start to multi-home, consumers will see more ads in the SS
equilibrium. Furthermore, consumers’ price is also higher than that under single-homing, i.e.,
pSS∗,MiC > p
SS∗
iC , because now the two platforms no longer need to compete for consumers as ag-
gressively in order to attract more advertisers. Therefore, consumers are worse off. Advertisers
are better off under multi-homing because they have reached more consumers, while platforms
are better off because their revenues from both sides of the market have increased.
When comparing each party’s welfare between SS and TT under multi-homing, we find that
consumers are better off in SS compared to that in TT when γS ≤ γ3 = 2αS−
√
3α2S + α
2
T + γ
2
T − 4αTγT .
On the other hand, advertisers are better off in SS compared to that in TT when γS ≤ γ4 =
γT + (αS − αT ). Recall that from Proposition 3, under single-homing, consumers and advertisers
can also be better off under sponsored content ads compared to that under traditional ads. Inter-
estingly, a comparison between the new threshold values of γS and those in Proposition 3 under
single-homing leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When advertisers multi-home, once both platforms shift from traditional ads
(TT) to sponsored content ads (SS),
1. consumers are less likely to be better off compared to the case of advertiser single-homing,
i.e., γ3 < γ1;
2. advertisers are more likely to be better off compared to the case of advertiser single-homing,
i.e., γ4 > γ2.
First, note that Proposition 4 is comparing consumer/advertiser surplus between SS and
TT across two conditions: advertiser multi-homing and advertiser single-homing (i.e., this is a
difference-in-difference comparison). The first part of Proposition 4 means that under multi-
homing, consumers’ surplus can still be higher in SS compared to that in TT, but it occurs in
a narrower range of γS given γ3 < γ1. In other words, as consumers’ marginal disutility from
sponsored content ads increases and some advertisers choose to multi-home, consumers are less
likely to be better off because platforms are compensating them less (Recall from Lemma 2, two
platforms no longer need to compete for consumers as aggressively to attract more advertisers.).
The second part of Proposition 4 states that advertisers are better off in a wider range of γS under
multi-homing because γ4 > γ2. The intuition can be first seen from the comparison between the
following ad price differences, (pSS∗,MiA − pTT∗,MiA )− (pSS∗iA − pTT∗iA ), which implies that the ad price
increase when platforms shift from TT to SS can be less significant under multi-homing. Fur-
thermore, multi-homing helps advertisers reach more consumers, and the benefits from sponsored
content ads over traditional ads are thus magnified.
24
5.2 Incompletely Covered Advertising Market
In the main text, we assumed that the markets for consumers and for advertisers are both fully
covered by the two platforms. Clearly, both platforms compete head-to-head on the advertisers’
side. In Section 5.1, we analyzed the situation where advertisers can choose to multi-home and the
ad side is still fully covered. This effectively means that the two platforms have some monopolistic
power on the advertising side because they no longer directly compete for advertisers. In this
section, we analyze a situation with an incompletely covered ad market that allows both the
direct competition for advertisers and some monopolistic power over them by the two platforms.
In other words, we combine the two features on the ad side of the previous models, and analyze
the equilibrium outcome.
Specifically, we assume that the two platforms are located at l1 = 1/3 and l2 = 2/3 on
the Hotelling line, where advertisers are uniformly distributed.23 In this context, two platforms
actively compete for advertisers located centrally (i.e., advertisers located at y ∈ [1/3, 2/3]) while
maintaining certain monopolistic power over advertisers located towards the left of l1 or the right
of l2 (i.e., advertisers with location z ∈ (0, 1/3) ∪ (2/3, 1)). The utilities for the two types of
advertisers when the focal platform adopts the ad format v (v ∈ {S, T}) are given as
UviA(y) = αvx
ev
iC − |yviA − li| − pviA, (30)
UviA(z) = αvx
ev
iC − |zviA − li| − pviA. (31)
The assumptions on the consumers remain the same as those in the main text and are thus not
repeated.
To enhance exposition, we only present the subgame where both platforms offer sponsored
content ads in this subsection.24 We focus on the parameter range where 7+12γS9 < αS <
4(1+γS)
3 ,
which ensures that the advertising market is partially covered in equilibrium.25 Solving the
23This assumption on the platforms’ specific locations is to simplify our analysis. Our results remain qualitatively
the same as long as the advertising market is incompletely covered by the two platforms.
24The analysis of all the subgames, TT, SS, TS/ST, as well as when each one is the equilibrium outcome, is
presented in Appendix A.5.
25When the condition αS ≥ 4(1+γS)3 holds, the advertising market will be fully covered. Similar conditions to
ensure incomplete ad market coverage can be identified for other subgames.
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platforms’ profit maximization problems leads to the following optimal prices and demand:
pSS∗iC =
15tC − 2αS(1 + 3αS − 9γS)
15
, xSS∗iC =
1
2
;
pSS∗iA =
1 + 3αS + 6γS
15
, xSS∗iA =
1 + 3αS − 4γS
10
.
Given the importance of the externality parameters, γS and αS , we first discuss their impact on
the optimal prices for both sides of the market below.
Lemma 3. The price for consumers increases in γS and decreases in αS, whereas the price for
advertisers increases in both γS and αS.
In contrast with our main model, the prices for consumers and advertisers depend on both γS
and αS when the advertising market is partially covered. Similar to the main model, consumers’
price decreases as αS increases (i.e.,
∂pSS∗iC
∂αS
< 0 if γS <
17
3 ). Intuitively, as αS increases, there
will be more advertisers on the platform which generate more disutility for consumers. Thus, the
platform has incentives to decrease the consumer price. Interestingly, the consumer price increases
as γS increases (i.e.,
∂pSS∗iC
∂γS
= 6αS5 > 0), and the rate of increase further rises as αS increases. A
higher γS indicates that consumers are more averse to sponsored content ads. In this case, the
platform has incentives to decrease its number of advertisers (i.e.,
∂xSS∗iA
∂γS
< 0). To compensate for
the potential loss in the ad market, the platform will increase the consumer price with relative
ease given its rival’s similar incentive to raise price and that the consumer side is fully covered.
Consistent with the main model, the ad price increases as γS increases (i.e.,
∂pSS∗iA
∂γS
> 0). This
happens because when consumers are more averse to ads, the platform has more incentives to
decrease its number of advertisers. Thus, to compensate for the demand loss in the ad market,
the platform will increase the advertiser price. In addition, the price for advertisers also increases
as αS increases (i.e.,
∂pSS∗iA
∂αS
> 0). This is because as αS increases, sponsored content ads become
more appealing to advertisers; as a result, the platform can charge a higher ad price.
After analyzing prices for both sides of the market, we next examine the impact of the exter-
nality parameters on platforms’ profitability in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In the SS equilibrium, there is a non-monotonic relationship between αS and
profits. In particular, when γS <
11
12 and
7+12γS
9 < αS <
4(1+γS)
3 , Π
SS∗
i decreases in αS; when
γS >
3
2 , Π
SS∗
i increases in αS; otherwise, Π
SS∗
i first increases and then decreases in αS.
Recall that the platforms’ profits always decrease in αS in our main model where advertisers
are fully served, because a higher αS leads to a lower price for consumers. However, once the
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market coverage for advertisers becomes incomplete, the impact of αS on the platforms’ profits
can be positive when γS is relatively high. Based on Lemma 3, with a relatively large γS , the
platforms can charge high prices for both sides of the market. As αS increases, although con-
sumers’ price decreases, the increase in both the advertisers’ price and their demand are large
enough to outweigh the loss from the consumer side. As a result, the platforms’ profits increase
in αS . Proposition 5 highlights the importance of market coverage (i.e., the extent of advertisers’
demand elasticity) in shaping how the cross-side network effects influence the platforms’ profits.
Managerially, this result echoes practitioners’ enthusiasm for the sponsored content ads, because
its greater appeal to advertisers can translate to greater profits for the platforms under the right
conditions.
6 Conclusion
Over the last few years, sponsored content advertising has become more popular with both media
platforms and advertisers. The main advantage of this advertising format is that readers are
likely to view these ads as editorial content by the media platform, and thus may be more en-
gaged and form a more positive impression about the underlying brands (advertisers). This type
of ads’ appeal to advertisers can be further enhanced when the media platforms avoid any click-
bait strategy and instead offer a judicious combination of information and promotion that make
the ad placement purposeful. However, if consumers identify sponsored content ads as imposed
promotional messages, they are likely to react more negatively to them. As a result, it becomes
an important question to understand the impact of sponsored content advertising in the context
of two-sided media markets.
Our analysis shows that whether or not a platform should adopt the sponsored content ads
depends largely on the cross-group externalities between consumers and advertisers. In partic-
ular, both platforms should offer sponsored content ads when advertisers’ marginal utility from
sponsored content is low, or when consumers’ extent of aversion towards this ad format is strong.
This seemingly surprising result shows that the two-sidedness of the media market plays a pivotal
role in understanding the equilibrium ad format strategies. Consistent with the industry practice,
we show that the ad price for sponsored content ads is higher than that for traditional ads. We
have also confirmed industry experts’ intuition that both advertisers and consumers can be better
off with sponsored content ads compared to the traditional ads, as long as consumers are not too
27
unhappy with the sponsored content ad format. Our analysis also suggests that if advertisers have
too strong affinity towards sponsored content advertising, a moderate amount of unhappiness from
consumers’ side would actually prevent the platforms from extracting more rents in aggregate.
Interestingly, although consumers dislike sponsored content ads more than they dislike traditional
ads, their surplus can increase when both platforms offer sponsored content ads, because now
they can enjoy a lower price. Furthermore, we find that when consumers have a relatively high
disutility from sponsored content ads, advertisers’ surplus may further increase if advertisers can
multi-home.
We demonstrate that it is possible for competing platforms to end up in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
outcome by both offering sponsored content ads. This happens because both platforms have
incentives to undercut their rival’s price for consumers in order to attract more advertisers. This
result highlights that even if one side of the market strongly prefers a particular instrument,
it might not be beneficial for the platform in the two-sided market to offer this instrument in
a competitive environment. This result also contributes to the advertising literature – while
existing wisdom suggests that the Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome in advertising emerges because of
competition over ad budget (Corfman and Lehmann 1994), we find that the same outcome can
be seen even when firms compete over the advertising format.
It is important to note that the existence of asymmetric equilibrium confirms that mere imi-
tation of the rival platform’s advertising strategy may adversely affect the profitability of a media
platform. By contrast, media platforms must pay close attention to advertisers’ receptiveness
and consumers’ sensitivity towards different advertising formats, two key factors that affect the
welfare and profits of all involved parties. Thus, an effective integration of sponsored content
with regular editorial content can help the advertisers to strengthen their relationships with the
consumers which in turn will make the consumers more accepting of sponsored content ads. The
platform can also improve the interactivity of the sponsored content ads to enhance advertisers’
benefit. For example, the media platform can offer more touch points on the sponsored content
ads where consumers can directly interact with different parts of the message so that they can be
more engaged and as a result, increases the appeal of such ads to advertisers.
This paper takes a first stab at understanding the strategic impact of sponsored content
advertising on media platforms, advertisers, and consumers. To simplify the analysis, we assumed
that platforms can either adopt the sponsored content or the traditional advertising. In reality,
a media platform can choose a hybrid of two ad formats. Furthermore, we focus on the full
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information disclosure case where consumers can perfectly identify sponsored content ads. In
practice, the transparency of a sponsored content ad can be a continuous strategic variable, and
regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission have varied guidelines across the world. As
a result, consumers may react differently depending on the transparency, the presentation style
and the content of the sponsored content ads. Future research can explore the implications of these
characteristics of sponsored content ads. It will also be interesting to consider the role of dynamics
in this context and analyze how consumers’ response to these ads change over time. Finally, the
collaboration between media platforms and advertisers to create high-quality sponsored content
can be very costly, and may affect the eventual ad choices. Future research can also study the
co-production of ads and organic content, and shed insights on when and how it is optimal to
engage in the co-creation of advertising, with or without any intervention from the regulatory
agencies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. pTS∗1C = (6tC(6tC−3αS−3αT+γS−γT )+(αS+αT )(αS+αT−γS)(αS+αT−2(γS+γT )−tC(α2S+3α2T−
4αT (γS+γT )+αS(4αT−6(γS+γT ))+2(γS+γT )2)))/(36tC−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS+γT ))),
pTS∗2C = (6tC(6tC−3αS−3αT−γS+γT )+(αS+αT )(αS+αT−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS+γT )−tC(3α2S+α2T +
4αS(αT −γS−γT )−6αT (γS +γT )+2(γS +γT )2)))/(36tC−(2(αS +αT )−γS−γT )(αS +αT −2(γS +γT ))),
pTS∗1A = (36tC−(αS−γS−γT )(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(γS+γT )−(2α2S+4αSαT+2α2T−6αSγS−6αT γS+γ2S−
4γT (αS+αT−γS))−(3γ2T−6tC(αS−αT−3γS−3γT )))/(36tC−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS+γT ))),
pTS∗2A = (36tC − (αT − γS − γT )(2(αS + αT ) − γS − γT )(γS + γT ) − (2α2S + 4αSαT + 2α2T − 4αSγS −
4αT γS + 3γ
2
S − 2γT (3αS + 3αT − 2γS))− (γ2T − 6tC(αS − αT + 3γS + 3γT )))/(36tC − (2(αS + αT )− γS −
γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT ))).
Below we show that when tC > tC = max{tC1, tC2, tC3, tC4} (which is a sufficient condition), ∂p
TS∗
1C
∂αS
<
0,
∂pTS∗2C
∂αS
< 0,
∂pTS∗1A
∂αS
< 0 and
∂pTS∗2A
∂αS
> 0.
First,
∂pTS∗1C
∂αS
= {(36tC−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS+γT )))((αS+αT )(αS+αT−γS)−2tC(9+
αS +2αT −3γS−3γT )+((αS +αT )−2(γS +γT ))(αS +αT −γS)(αS +αT −2γS−2γ−T ))− ((5(γS +γT )−
4(αS+αT ))(36t
2
C+(αS+αT )(αS+αT−S)(αS+αT−2γS−2γT )−tC(α2S+3α2T +4αSαT +6(3αT +γS−γT )+
6αS(3−γS−γT )−4αT (γS+γT )+2(γS+γT )2)))}/(36tC−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT −2(γS+γT )))2.
The sign of the above expression is the sign of its numerator, and it will be negative when tC > tC1
since the numerator is a quadratic, concave function of tC , where tC1 is the larger root and is given below:
tC1 = {[(α2S(4αT − 7γS − 7γT − 72) + 2αS(4α2T − 3αT (γS + γT 24) + 2(γS + γT )2 + 96γS + 84γT ) +
α2T (γS + γT − 72) + 4α3T − 2αT (2(5γS − 42)γT + γS(5γS − 96) + 5γ2T ) + 2(γS + γT )((2γS − 33)γT + (γS −
39)γS + γ
2
T ))
2 + 144(2αS + γS + γT − 18)(2α2S + 4αSαT − 2αS(γS + γT ) + 2α2T − 2αT (γS + γT ) + γS(γS +
γT ))(αS +αT −2(γS +γT ))2]1/2 +[2αT (2α2S−3αS(24−γS−γT )−5(γS +γT )2−12(8γS +7γT ))−7α2SγS−
7α2SγT − 72α2S + α2T (8αS + γS + γT − 72) + 4αSγ2S + 8αSγSγT + 192αSγS + 4αSγ2T + 168αSγT + 4α3T +
6γ2SγT + 2γ
3
S − 78γ2S + 6γSγ2T − 144γSγT + 2γ3T − 66γ2T ]}/(72(18− 2αS − γS − γT )).
Second,
∂pTS∗2C
∂αS
= {[(36tC − (2(αS + αT ) − γS − γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT )))((αS + αT )(3αS + αT −
4γS)− 2tC(9 + 3αS + 2αT − 2γS − 2γT )− 2(3(αS +αT )− γS)− 2γ2T )] + [(4(αS +αT )− 5(γS + γT ))(36t2C +
(αS +αT )(αS +αT−T )(αS +αT − 2γS − 2γT )− tC(3α2S +α2T + 2αS(9 + 2αT − 2γS − 2γT ) + 6(γS − γT ) +
6αT (3− γS − γT ) + 2(γS + γT )2))]}/{36tC − (2(αS + αT )− γS − γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT ))}2.
The sign of the above expression is the sign of its numerator, and similar to the proof above, it will be
negative when tC > tC2, where tC2 is given by
tC2 = {[((α2S(4αT − 7γS − 7γT + 72) + 2αS(4α2T − 3αT (γS + γT − 24) + 2(γS + γT )2− 12(7γS + 8γT )) +
α2T γS + γT + 72) + 4α
3
T − 2αT (2(5γS + 48)γT + γS(5γS + 84) + 5γ2T ) + 2(γS + γT )((2γS + 39)γT + γS(γS +
1
33) + γ2T ))
2− 144(2αS + γS + γT + 18)(γT (γS − 2(αS +αT )) + 2(αS +αT )(αS +αT − γS) + γ2T )(αS +αT −
2(γS + γT ))
2]1/2 + [3αS(γS + γT − 24) − 2αT (−2α2S + 5(γS + γT )2 + 84γS + 96γT ) − 7α2SγS − 7α2SγT +
72α2S + α
2
T (8αS + γS + γT + 72) + 4αSγ
2
S + 8αSγSγT − 168αSγS + 4αSγ2T − 192αSγT + 4α3T + 6γ2SγT +
2γ3S + 66γ
2
S + 6γSγ
2
T + 144γSγT + 2γ
3
T + 78γ
2
T ]}/(72(18 + 2αS + γS + γT )).
Third,
∂pTS∗1A
∂αS
= {[36tC−(2(αS +αT )−γS−γT )(αS +αT −2(γS +γT ))][6γS−6tC +4γT +3(γS +γT )2−
2αT (2+γS +γT )+4αS(1+γS +γT )]+(4(αS +αT )−5(γS +γT ))[−2α2S(γS +γT +1)+αS(−2αT (γS +γT +
2)+3(γS+γT )
2+6γS+4γT )−2α2T +2αT γ2S+γ2T (2αT−3(γS+1))+γT (4αT (γS+1)−γS(3γS+4))+6αT γS−
γ3S−γ2S−γ3T +6tC(−αS +αT +3(γS +γT +2))]}/{36tC − (2(αS +αT )−γS−γT )(αS +αT −2(γS +γT ))}2.
The sign of the above expression is the sign of its numerator, and it will be negative when tC > tC3,
where tC3 is given by
tC3 = {[4α2S(−2α2T + 10αT (γS + γT ) + 7(γS + γT )2 + 6(γS − γT )) − 16α3S(αT − 3(γS + γT )) + 4α4S +
8αS(−4α2T (γS + γT ) + 6α3T −αT (2(γS + 9)γT + (γS − 18)γS + γ2T )− 3(γS + γT )(2(γS − 1)γT + γS(γS + 2) +
γ2T ))− 8α2T ((8γS + 15)γT + γS(4γS − 15) + 4γ2T )− 24α3T (γS + γT ) + 36α4T + 4αT (γS + γT )(2(5γS + 3)γT +
γS(5γS − 6) + 5γ2T ) + γ2S((γS − 108)γS + 36) + 4(γS + 27)γ3T + 6(γS(γS + 18) + 6)γ2T + 4γS((γS − 27)γS −
18)γT + γ
4
T ]
1/2 − 2α2S + 4αS(αT − 3(γS + γT )) + 6α2T − 10αT (γS + γT ) + 5(γS + γT )2 + 6γS − 6γT }/72.
Finally,
∂pTS∗2A
∂αS
= {(36tC − (2(αS + αT )− γS − γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT )))2(3tC − 2αS + 2γS + 3γT +
(γS + γT )
2 − αT (2 + γS + γT )) − [(5(γS + γT ) − 4(αS + αT ))(36tC − (αT − γS − γT )(2(αS + αT ) − γS −
γT )(γS + γT )− (2α2S + 4αSαT + 2α2T − 4αSγS − 4αT γS + 3γ2S − 2γT (3αS + 3αT − 2γS))− (γ2T − 6tC(αS −
αT + 3γS + 3γT )))]}/{36tC − (2(αS + αT )− γS − γT )(αS + αT − 2(γS + γT ))}2.
The sign of the above expression is the sign of its numerator, and it will be positive when tC > tC4,
where tC4 is given by
tC4 = {[(4α2S(−2α2T + 10αT (γS + γT ) + 7(γS + γT )2 + 6(γS − γT ))− 16α3S(αT − 3(γS + γT )) + 4α4S +
8αS(−4α2T γS + γT ) + 6α3T −αT (2(γS + 9)γT + (γS − 18)γS + γ2T )− 3(γS + γT )(2(γS − 1)γT + γS(γS + 2) +
γ2T ))− 8α2T ((8γS + 15)γT + γS(4γS − 15) + 4γ2T )− 24α3T (γS + γT ) + 36α4T + 4αT (γS + γT )(2(5γS + 3)γT +
γS(5γS − 6) + 5γ2T ) + γ2S((γS − 108)γS + 36) + 4(γS + 27)γ3T + 6(γS(γS + 18) + 6)γ2T + 4γS((γS − 27)γS −
18)γT + γ
4
T ]
1/2 − 2α2S + 4αS(αT − 3(γS + γT )) + 6α2T − 10αT (γS + γT ) + 5(γS + γT )2 + 6γS − 6γT }/72.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. ΠTT1 −ΠST1 = γT−αT2 + (2(αT+αS−γT−uS)(αT−γT−γS)(αS+αT−γS−γT )+tC(αS−αT )(2αS+γS+γT )2((2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))−36tC)
+ ((αS+αT+2γS)(γS−γT )−6tC(αS+5αT−γS−5γT ))2((2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))−36tC) > 0 if and only if α
∗ > αS > α1 where
α∗ = 6tC+2tCαT−2γ
2
S+γT−tCγT−αT γT+γ
2
T−γS(1+tC−αT+γT )
4(tC−γS)
+√
((αT−2γS−1)γS+tC (6+2αT−γS−γT )+γT−(αT+γS)γT+γ2T )2+8(tC−γS)(2γSγT−γS(αT+α
2
T
+2γS)+αT (1−αT+γS)γT+αT γ2T−tC (6(γS−γT )−αT (6−γS−γT )))
4(tC−γS)
,
α1 =
6tC+2tCαT−2γ2S+γT−tCγT−αT γT+γ
2
T−γS(1+tC−αT+γT )
4(tC−γS)
−√
((αT−2γS−1)γS+tC (6+2αT−γS−γT )+γT−(αT+γS)γT+γ2T )2+8(tC−γS)(2γSγT−γS(αT+α
2
T
+2γS)+αT (1−αT+γS)γT+αT γ2T−tC (6(γS−γT )−αT (6−γS−γT )))
4(tC−γS)
.
2
Similarly, ΠSS1 −ΠTS1 = γS−αS+tC2 − (2(αS−γS−γT )((αS+αT−γS)(αS+αT−γS−γT )+tC(γS+γT−αS−3αT ))2(−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))+36tC)
− (36t2C−tC(5αS+αT−5γS−γT )−(γS−γT )(αS+αT+2γT ))2(−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))+36tC) > 0 if and only if α2 > αS > α∗∗ where
α2 =
γS−αT γS+γ2S−γT+αT γT+γSγT−tC (6−2αT−γS−γT )
2(γS+γT )
+√
(γS(1−αT+γS)−(1−αT−γS)γT−tC (6−2αT−γS−γT ))2+4(γS+γT )(αT γS(1+γS)+(2α2T+2γS−αT (1+γS))γT−2(1+αT )γ
2
T
+tC (6(γS−γT )−αT (6−2αT−γS−γT )))
4(2(γS+γT )
,
α∗∗ = γS−αT γS+γ
2
S−γT+αT γT+γSγT−tC (6−2αT−γS−γT )
2(γS+γT )
−√
(γS(1−αT+γS)−(1−αT−γS)γT−tC (6−2αT−γS−γT ))2+4(γS+γT )(αT γS(1+γS)+(2α2T+2γS−αT (1+γS))γT−2(1+αT )γ
2
T
+tC (6(γS−γT )−αT (6−2αT−γS−γT )))
4(2(γS+γT )
.
It can also be easily shown that the signs (which are equal to the numerators) of both profit
differences are quadratic and concave functions of αS . The upper bound on αS in Equation (7) in
Section 3.4, α¯S , is given by α¯S = min{[6tC + 2tCαT − 2γ2S + γT − tCγT −αT γT + γ2T − γS(1 + tC −αT +
γT )+{((αT −2γS−1)γS + tC(6+2αT −γS−γT )+γT − (αT +γS)γT +γ2T )2 +8(tC−γS)(2γSγT −γS(αT +
α2T + 2γS) + αT (1− αT + γS)γT + αT γ2T − tC(6(γS − γT )− αT (6− γS − γT )))}1/2]/(4(tC − γS)), (γT −
γS(γS + γT + 1)− tC(γS + γT − 6))/(γT + 2tC − γS), (18− γS − γT )/2}.
From Equation (7), it can be derived that α∗ > αS > 0 > α∗∗. Thus, for the equilibrium analysis, we
only need to investigate the following two regions in terms of αS : (i) α1 > α2 > 0 and (ii) α2 > α1 > 0.
Given the above profit differences, the equilibrium conditions in the first region (α1 > α2 > 0) are as
follows:
When αS > α1, TT is the unique equilibrium. When α1 > αS > α2, TS/ST is the unique equilibrium.
When α2 > αS > 0, SS is the unique equilibrium. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Given the above profit differences, the equilibrium conditions in the second region (α2 > α1 > 0) are
as follows:
When αS > α2, TT is the unique equilibrium. When α2 > αS > α1, TT and SS are both equilibria.
When α1 > αS > 0, SS is the unique equilibrium. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
Also, ΠSS1 −ΠTS1 > 0 if γS > γA or γS < γB and ΠTT1 −ΠST1 > 0 if γC > γS > γD where,
γA =
α2S+αT γT−αT−2γT−αS(−αT+γT+tC+1)+αT tC−6tC
2(αS+αT )
+√
4(αS+αT )(γT (αS+αT )(αS−2αT+1)+2(αT+1)γ2T+γT tC (−αS+αT+6)−2(αT−3)tC (αS−αT ))+(γT (αS−αT+2)−(αS−1)(αS+αT )+tC (αS−αT+6))2
2(αS+αT )
,
γB =
α2S+αT γT−αT−2γT−αS(−αT+γT+tC+1)+αT tC−6tC
2(αS+αT )
−√
4(αS+αT )(γT (αS+αT )(αS−2αT+1)+2(αT+1)γ2T+γT tC (−αS+αT+6)−2(αT−3)tC (αS−αT ))+(γT (αS−αT+2)−(αS−1)(αS+αT )+tC (αS−αT+6))2
2(αS+αT )
,
γC =
2α2S−α
2
T+αT γT−αT+2γT−αS(−αT+γT+tC+1)+αT tC−6tC
4(1+αS)
+√
(−2α2
S
+γT (αS−αT−2)−αSαT+αS+α2T+αT+tC (αS−αT+6))2+8(αS+1)(γT (αS+αT )(−αT+γT+1)+γT tC (−αS+αT+6)−2(αS−3)tC (αS−αT ))
4(1+αS)
,
γD =
2α2S−α
2
T+αT γT−αT+2γT−αS(−αT+γT+tC+1)+αT tC−6tC
4(1+αS)
−√
(−2α2
S
+γT (αS−αT−2)−αSαT+αS+α2T+αT+tC (αS−αT+6))2+8(αS+1)(γT (αS+αT )(−αT+γT+1)+γT tC (−αS+αT+6)−2(αS−3)tC (αS−αT ))
4(1+αS)
.
Finally, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes in terms of γS . It can be easily shown that the sign
of (ΠSS1 −ΠTS1 ) is a quadratic and convex function of γS , whereas the sign of (ΠTT1 −ΠST1 ) is a quadratic
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and concave function of γS . Similar to the assumption on the upper bound on αS , we impose a lower
bound on γS , γS , which is given by
γ
S
= max{(α2S + αT γT − αT − 2γT − αS(−αT + γT + tC + 1) + αT tC − 6tC − (4(αS + αT )(γT (αS +
αT )(αS − 2αT + 1) + 2(αT + 1)γ2T + γT tC(−αS + αT + 6)− 2(αT − 3)tC(αS − αT )) + (γT (αS − αT + 2)−
(αS − 1)(αS + αT ) + tC(αS − αT + 6))2)1/2)/(2(αS + αT )), (2α2S − α2T + αT γT − αT + 2γT − αS(−αT +
γT + tC + 1) + αT tC − 6tC − ((−2α2S + γT (αS − αT − 2)− αSαT + αS + α2T + αT + tC(αS − αT + 6))2 +
8(αS + 1)(γT (αS +αT )(−αT + γT + 1) + γT tC(−αS +αT + 6)− 2(αS − 3)tC(αS −αT )))1/2)/(4(1 +αS))}.
Given the assumption γS > γS , we only need to investigate the equilibrium outcomes in the following
two regions in terms of γS : (i) γA > γC > 0 and (ii) γC > γA > 0.
Given the above profit differences, the equilibrium conditions in the first region (γA > γC > 0) are as
follows:
When γS > γA, SS is the unique equilibrium. When γA > γS > γC , TS/ST is the unique equilibrium.
When γC > γS > 0, TT is the unique equilibrium.
Given the above profit differences, the equilibrium conditions in the second region (γC > γA > 0) are
as follows:
When γS > γC , SS is the unique equilibrium. When γC > γS > γA, TT and SS are both equilibria.
When γA > γS > 0, TT is the unique equilibrium. This completes the proof of the discussion following
Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. ΠTT∗i =
tC+1−αT+γT
2 and Π
SS∗
i =
tC+1−αS+γS
2 . Thus, Π
SS∗
i < Π
TT∗
i iff (γS − γT ) <
(αS−αT ). Recall that when α1 > α2 > αS > 0 or α2 > α1 > αS > 0, SS is unique equilibrium. As
a result, in this parameter range, SS is a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome when (γS−γT ) < (αS−αT ).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consumer surplus when both platforms offer traditional ads is CS(TT ) = 2
∫ 1/2
0 (u0 −
tCx − pTT1C − γT /2)dx = u0 + αT − 5tC/4 − γT /2. By contrast, consumer surplus when both
platforms offer sponsored content ads is CS(SS) = 2
∫ 1/2
0 (u0− tCx− pSS1C − γS/2)dx = u0 +αS −
5tC/4− γS/2. Therefore, the difference in consumer surplus across the two advertising formats is
CS(SS)−CS(TT ) = αS −αT − γS/2 + γT /2. This is positive when γS ≤ γT + 2(αS −αT ) = γ1.
Advertiser surplus when both platforms offer traditional ads is AS(TT ) = 2
∫ 1/2
0 (αT /2− x−
pTT1A )dx = αT /2− 5/4− γT . By contrast, advertiser surplus when both platforms offer sponsored
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content ads is AS(SS) = 2
∫ 1/2
0 (αS/2−x−pSS1A)dx = αS/2−5/4−γS . Therefore, the difference in
advertisers’ surplus across the two advertising formats is AS(SS)−AS(TT ) = αS−αT−2γS2 + γT .
This is positive when γS ≤ γT + (αS−αT )2 = γ2.
Because αS > αT , we find that γT +2(αS−αT ) > γT + (αS−αT )2 , so that compared to advertiser
surplus, it is more likely for consumer surplus to improve when platforms shift from traditional
ads to sponsored content ads.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. When advertisers are multi-homing, consumers pay pSS∗,MiC =
4tC−αS(αS−3γS)
4 , and when
advertisers are single-homing, consumers pay pSS∗iC = tC − αS . First, note that pSS∗,MiC is always
higher than pSS∗iC (otherwise it would violate the condition that multi-homing advertisers’ demand
must be less than 1). Second, we also know that consumers experience more advertising under
multi-homing as compared to that under single-homing. As a result, given that consumers’
utility function is USiC = u0 − tC |xSiC − li| − pSiC − γSxeSiA, and both pSiC and xeSiA are higher under
multi-homing, total consumer surplus is lower under multi-homing compared to that under single-
homing.
Advertisers’ surplus when some of the advertisers are multi-homing isAS(SS)M = 2
∫ (αS−γS)/4
0
(αS/2−x−pSS,M1A )dx = (αS−γS)
2
16 . Advertisers’ surplus when all the advertisers are single-homing
is AS(SS)S = 2
∫ 1/2
0 (αS/2−x−pSS1A)dx = αS/2−5/4−γS . Note that (AS(SS)M−AS(SS)S) is a
quadratic and convex function of γS . Thus, AS(SS)
M > AS(SS)S when γS > αS−8+2
√
11− 2αS
or γS < αS − 8 − 2
√
11− 2αS . When αS > 5.5, both of the above cutoff values of γS are com-
plex numbers, implying that AS(SS)M > AS(SS)S always holds. On the other hand, when
αS < 5.5, both of the above cutoff values of γS are negative numbers again implying that
AS(SS)M > AS(SS)S . Thus, advertisers are better off under multi-homing.
Platforms’ profit when some of the advertisers are multi-homing are ΠSS∗,Mi =
8tC−α2S+6αSγS−γ2S
16 .
When all the advertisers are single-homing, platforms’ profits are ΠSS∗,Si =
1+tC−αS+γS
2 . Π
SS∗,M
i >
ΠSS∗,Si when 4 + 3γS − 2
√
2(1 + γS) < αS < 4 + 3γS + 2
√
2(1 + γS). Given that each platform’s
demand from advertisers in equilibrium is between 12 and 1 in the case of advertiser multi-homing,
we obtain the following condition: 2 < αS − γS < 4. Based on this condition, it can be easily
shown that the inequalities 4 + 3γS − 2
√
2(1 + γS) < αS < 4 + 3γS + 2
√
2(1 + γS) always hold.
Thus, platforms are better off under multi-homing.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In the case of multi-homing, consumers are better off in SS compared to that in TT
when γS ≤ γ3 = 2αS −
√
3α2S + α
2
T + γ
2
T − 4αTγT . By contrast, advertisers are better off in
SS compared to that in TT when γS ≤ γ4 = γT + (αS − αT ). Recall that γ1 and γ2 are the
corresponding thresholds in the case of single-homing.
γ3 < γ1 = γT + 2(αS −αT )⇔ (3α2S +α2T + γ2T − 4αTγT ) > (2αT − γT )2, which is always true.
Similarly, it can be easily shown that γ4 > γ2 = γT +
(αS−αT )
2 is also always true.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We first examine the impact of γS and αS on the price for consumers.
∂pSS∗iC
∂γS
= 6αS5 > 0,
∂pSS∗iC
∂αS
= −2(1+6αS−9γS)15 < 0 when
7+12γS
9 < αS <
4(1+γS)
3 if γS <
17
3 .
Next, we examine the impact of γS and αS on the price for advertisers.
∂pSS∗iA
∂γS
= 25 > 0,
∂pSS∗iA
∂αS
= 15 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the SS equilibrium, platform i’s profit is ΠSS∗i =
1−21α2S−24γ2S+75tC−4αS+2γS+96αSγS
150 , and
thus we have
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
= −2+21αS−48γS75 .
It is easy to see that
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
|
αS=
7+12γS
9
= 12γS−1145 and
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
|
αS=
4(1+γS)
3
= 4γS−615 . Therefore,
when γS <
11
12 ,
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
< 0 holds; when γS >
3
2 ,
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
> 0 holds; otherwise, there exists 7+12γS9 <
α∗S <
4(1+γS)
3 such that
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
> 0 if αS < α
∗
S and
∂ΠSS∗i
∂αS
≤ 0 if αS ≥ α∗S .
A.2 Impact of Content from Sponsored Content Ads
Define the threshold u∗ = 6tC − α2T + 3αTγT − αT − 2γ2T − γT and assume that u∗ > |uS |.
ΠST1 −ΠTT1 = uS(uS+6tC−α
2
T+3αT γT−αT−2γ2T−γT )
2(9tC−2α2T+5αT γT−2γ2T )
= uS(uS+u
∗)
2(9tC−2α2T+5αT γT−2γ2T )
, and
ΠSS1 −ΠTS1 = uS(−uS+6tC−α
2
T+3αT γT−αT−2γ2T−γT )
2(9tC−2α2T+5αT γT−2γ2T )
= uS(u
∗−uS)
2(9tC−2α2T+5αT γT−2γ2T )
.
ΠST1 − ΠTT1 > 0 when uS > 0 or when uS < 0 and |uS | > u∗ (which violates the assumption
that u∗ > |uS |). By contrast, ΠSS1 − ΠTS1 > 0 when 0 < uS < u∗. As a result, SS is the
unique equilibrium when 0 < uS < u
∗. On the other hand, TT is the unique equilibrium when
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ΠST1 − ΠTT1 < 0 and ΠSS1 − ΠTS1 < 0, which translates to the following conditions: uS < 0 and
|uS | < u∗.
A.3 Total Impact of Sponsored Content Ads
ΠST1 −ΠTT1 = αT−γT2 − (2(αT+αS−γT−uS)(αT−γT−γS)(αS+αT−γS−γT )+tC(αS−αT )(2αS+γS+γT )2((2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))−36tC)
− ((2uS−αS−αT−2γS)(2uS−γS+γT )+6tC(4uS−αS−5αT+γS+5γT ))2((2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))−36tC) > 0 when αS > αS1 or αS < αS2, where
αS1 = {(6tC + 2tCαT − 2γ2S + γT − tCγT − αT γT + γ2T − γS(1 + tC − αT + γT ) + 2uS(αT − γS − γT +
1)) + [((αT − 2γS − 1)γS + tC(6 + 2αT − γS − γT ) + 2uS(αT − γS − γT + 1) + γT − (αT + γS)γT + γ2T )2 +
8(tC − γS)(2γSγT − 4u2SγS(αT + α2T + 2γS) + αT (1− αT + γS)γT + αT γ2T + 2uS(α2T + αT (−2γS − 2γT +
1) + (γS + γT )
2 + 3γS − γT )− tC(6(γS − γT )− αT (6− γS − γT )− 24uS))]1/2}/(4(tC − γS)),
αS2 = {(6tC + 2tCαT − 2γ2S + γT − tCγT − αT γT + γ2T − γS(1 + tC − αT + γT ) + 2uS(αT − γS − γT +
1))− [((αT − 2γS − 1)γS + tC(6 + 2αT − γS − γT ) + 2uS(αT − γS − γT + 1) + γT − (αT + γS)γT + γ2T )2 +
8(tC − γS)(2γSγT − 4u2SγS(αT + α2T + 2γS) + αT (1− αT + γS)γT + αT γ2T + 2uS(α2T + αT (−2γS − 2γT +
1) + (γS + γT )
2 + 3γS − γT )− tC(6(γS − γT )− αT (6− γS − γT )− 24uS))]1/2}/(4(tC − γS)).
Similarly, ΠSS1 −ΠTS1 = γS−αS+tC2 − (2(αS−γS−γT )((uS+αS+αT−γS)(αS+αT−γS−γT )+tC(γS+γT−αS−3αT ))2(−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))+36tC)
− (36t2C−tC(4uS+5αS+αT−5γS−γT )+(2uS−γS+γT )(2uS+αS+αT+2γT ))2(−(2(αS+αT )−γS−γT )(αS+αT−2(γS−γT ))+36tC) > 0 if αS3 > αS > αS4, where
αS3 = {(2uS(2γS + 2γT − 1 − αT )γS − αT γS + γ2S − γT + αT γT + γSγT − tC(6 − 2αT − γS − γT )) +
[{(γS(1− αT + γS) + 2uS(1 + αT − 2γS − 2γT )− (1− αT − γS)γT − tC(6− 2αT − γS − γT ))2 + 4(2uS +
γS + γT )(4u
2
S +αT γS(1 + γS) + (2α
2
T + 2γS −αT (1 + γS))γT − 2(1 +αT )γ2T − 2uS(αT (γS + γT − 1) + (γS +
γT )
2 − γS + 3γT ) + tC(24uS + 6(γS − γT )− αT (6− 2αT − γS − γT )))}1/2]}/(2(2uS + γS + γT )),
αS4 = {(2uS(2γS + 2γT − 1 − αT )γS − αT γS + γ2S − γT + αT γT + γSγT − tC(6 − 2αT − γS − γT )) −
[{(γS(1− αT + γS) + 2uS(1 + αT − 2γS − 2γT )− (1− αT − γS)γT − tC(6− 2αT − γS − γT ))2 + 4(2uS +
γS + γT )(4u
2
S +αT γS(1 + γS) + (2α
2
T + 2γS −αT (1 + γS))γT − 2(1 +αT )γ2T − 2uS(αT (γS + γT − 1) + (γS +
γT )
2 − γS + 3γT ) + tC(24uS + 6(γS − γT )− αT (6− 2αT − γS − γT )))}1/2]}/(2(2uS + γS + γT )).
A.4 Multi-homing Analysis
When advertisers are multi-homing, the equilibrium profit differences are as follows,
ΠTT1 −ΠST1 =
(α2S+α
2
T+γ
2
S+γ
2
T−12tC−4αSγS−4αT γT )2(8tC+6αT γT−α2T−γ2T )−4((αT−γT )2−2αSγS−6tC)2(8tC−(αS−γS)2+4αT γT )
16(α2S+α
2
T+γ
2
S+γ
2
T−12tC−4αSγS−4αT γT )2
.
The above expression would be positive under the following sufficient conditions: (8tC +
6αTγT − α2T − γ2T ) > 0 and (8tC − (αS − γS)2 + 4αTγT ) < 0. These two inequalities are satisfied
when αS > αSa = γS + 2
√
αTγT + 2tC and αT < αTa = 3γT + 2
√
2
√
γ2T + tC .
7
Similarly, ΠTS1 −ΠSS1 =
4((αS−γS)2−2αT γT−6tC)2(8tC−(αT−γT )2+4αSγS)−(8tC+6αSγS−α2S−γ2S)(α2S+α2T+γ2S+γ2T−12tC−4αSγS−4αT γT )2
16(α2S+α
2
T+γ
2
S+γ
2
T−12tC−4αSγS−4αT γT )2
.
The above expression would be positive under the following sufficient conditions: (8tC−(αT −
γT )
2 + 4αSγS) > 0 and (8tC + 6αSγS − α2S − γ2S) < 0. These two inequalities are satisfied when
αS > αSb = 3γS + 2
√
2
√
γ2S + tC and αT < αTb = γT + 2
√
αSγS + 2tC .
Therefore, when αS > max{αSa, αSb} and αT < min{αTa, αTb}, TT is the unique equilibrium.
When αS < min{αSa, αSb} and αT > max{αTa, αTb}, SS is the unique equilibrium. When
αSb < αS < αSa and αTa < αT < αTb, asymmetric equilibrium TS/ST occurs. Finally, when
αSa < αS < αSb and αTb < αT < αTa, multiple equilibria arise where both SS and TT are
equilibria.
Prices and profits under each subgame are as follows,
pTT∗,MiC =
4tC − αT (αT − 3γT )
4
, (1)
pTT∗,MiA =
(αT + γT )
4
, (2)
ΠTT∗,Mi =
8tC − α2T + 6αTγT − γ2T
16
, (3)
pSS∗,MiC =
4tC − αS(αS − 3γS)
4
, (4)
pSS∗,MiA =
(αS + γS)
4
, (5)
ΠSS∗,Mi =
8tC − α2S + 6αSγS − γ2S
16
, (6)
pTS∗,M1C =
(6tC − (αS − γS)2 + 2αTγT )(4tC + 2αSγS − αT (αT − γT ))
24tC − 2(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T )
, (7)
pTS∗,M2C =
(6tC − (αT − γT )2 + 2αSγS)(4tC + 2αTγT − αS(αS − γS))
24tC − 2(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T )
, (8)
pTS∗,M1A =
(6tC − (αS − γS)2 + 2αTγT )(αT + γT )
24tC − 2(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T )
, (9)
pTS∗,M2A =
(6tC − (αT − γT )2 + 2αSγS)(αS + γS)
24tC − 2(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T )
, (10)
ΠTS∗,M1 =
((αS − γS)2 − 2αTγT − 6tC)2(8tC − (αT − γT )2 + 4αSγS)
4(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T − 12tC)
, (11)
ΠTS∗,M2 =
((αT − γT )2 − 2αSγS − 6tC)2(8tC − (αS − γS)2 + 4αTγT )
4(α2S − 4αSγS + α2T − 4αTγT + γ2S + γ2T − 12tC)
. (12)
Due to the analytical complexity, the analysis above uses a set of sufficient conditions to charac-
terize the equilibrium outcomes. We can also fully characterize the equilibrium (with sufficient
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and necessary conditions) using the parameter tC . Note that the signs of (Π
TT
1 − ΠST1 ) and
(ΠTS1 − ΠSS1 ) are both concave functions of tC . Denote the two roots of tCa and tCb (where
tCa > tCb) such that Π
TT
1 − ΠST1 = 0 when tC = tCa or tC = tCb. Similarly, denote the
two roots of tCc and tCd (where tCc > tCd) such that Π
TS
1 − ΠSS1 = 0 when tC = tCc or
tC = tCd. As a result, the necessary and sufficient conditions for each equilibrium outcome
is given as follows. When tC > max{tCa, tCc}, or tC < min{tCb, tCd}, SS is the unique equi-
librium. When max{tCb, tCd} < tC < min{tCa, tCc}, TT is the unique equilibrium. When
max{tCa, tCd} < tC < tCc, or tCd < tC < min{tCc, tCb}, asymmetric equilibrium TS/ST arises.
Finally, when max{tCb, tCc} < tC < tCa, or tCb < tC < min{tCa, tCd}, both TT and SS are
equilibria.
A.5 Incompletely Covered Advertising Market Analysis
In this section, we analyze the extension in which the consumer market is fully covered but the
advertising market is partially covered. First, we present the optimal strategies for two platforms
when they choose the same advertising strategies.
When both platforms offer sponsored content ads, platform 1’s demand from consumers and
advertisers are given by (those of platform 2’s are symmetrically defined):
xSS1C =
pSS2C − pSS1C + tC − γSxeSS1A + γSxeSS2A
2tC
,
ySS1A =
3(pSS1A − pSS2A) + 1 + 3αS(xeSS1C − xeSS2C )
6
, advertisers located between (1/3, 2/3),
zSS1A = αSx
eSS
1C − pSS1A , advertisers located between (0, 1/3),
xSS1A = y
SS
1A + z
SS
1A =
3pSS2A − 9pSS1A + 1 + 9αSxeSS1C − 3αSxeSS2C
6
.
With the assumption of rational expectations, xSSiC = x
eSS
iC and x
SS
iA = x
eSS
iA , we obtain the
following prices and demand when both platforms offer sponsored content ads after solving the
9
platforms’ optimization problems:
pSS∗iC =
(15tC − 2αS)− 6αS(αS − 3γS)
15
,
pSS∗iA =
1 + 3αS + 6γS
15
,
xSS∗iC =
1
2
,
xSS∗iA =
1 + 3αS − 4γS
10
.
The platforms’ profits are ΠSS∗i =
1−21α2S−24γ2S+(75tC−4αS+2γS)+96αSγS
150 .
When both platforms offer traditional ads, we obtain the following prices and demand after
solving the platforms’ optimization problems:
pTT∗iC =
(15tC − 2αT )− 6αT (αT − 3γT )
15
,
pTT∗iA =
1 + 3αT + 6γT
15
,
xTT∗iC =
1
2
,
xTT∗iA =
1 + 3αT − 4γT
10
.
The platforms’ profits are ΠTT∗i =
1−21α2T−24γ2T+(75tC−4αT+2γT )+96αT γT
150 .
When two platforms offer different types of ads (e.g., platform 1 offers traditional ads and
platform 2 offers sponsored content ads), we obtain the following prices after solving the platforms’
optimization problem:
pTS∗1C = [(14tC(90tC − 5αS − 7αT + 3γS − 3γT ) − (−6α3S − 26α2SαT − 26αSα2T − 6α3T + 42α2SγS +
60αSαT γS +26α
2
T γS−36αSγ2S−24αT γ2S +8α2SγT +36αSαT γT +36α2T γT +20αSγSγT −24αT γSγT +7αT −
3γS +3γT )+3tC(99α
2
S +76αSαT +153α
2
T −498αSγS−76αT γS +102γ2S−102αSγT −348αT γT +52γSγT +
6γ2T )) + 12(3α
3
S(αT − 6γS − γT ) + α2S(10α2T − 15αT γS + 36γ2S − 11αT γT + 15γSγT + γ2T ) − αT (3α2T (γS +
6γT ) + γS(3γ
2
S + 10γSγT + 3γ
2
T ) − 2αT (5γ2S + 6γSγT + 9γ2T )) + αS(3α3T − 2γS(3γS + γT )2 − 4α2T (5γS +
3γT ) + αT (15γ
2
S + 56γSγT + 9γ
2
T )))]/G,
pTS∗1A = (84tC − (12α2S + 16αSαT + 4α2T − 42αSγS − 22αT γS + 9γ2S + 18tC(3αS − 17αT − 9γS − 19γT )−
2αSγT − 38αT γT + 2γSγT + 21γ2T )− 3((3γS + γT )2(γS + 3γT ) + 6α2S(4αT + 3γS + 5γT )− 8α2T (γS + 6γT ) +
2αT (9γ
2
S − 14γSγT − 27γ2T ) + αS(8α2T − 42αT γS − 27γ2S + 10αT γT − 66γSγT − 19γ2T )))/G,
pTS∗2C = [14tC(90tC−7αS−5αT−3γS+3γT )−(−6α3S−26α2SαT−26αSα2T−6α3T +36α2SγS+36αSαT γS+
8α2T γS + 26α
2
SγT + 60αSαT γT + 42α
2
T γT − 24αSγSγT + 20αT γSγT − 24αSγ2T − 36αT γ2T + 3tC(153α2S +
99α2T + 6γ
2
S + 4αS(19αT − 87γS − 19γT ) + 52γSγT + 102γ2T − 6αT (17γS + 83γT ))) + 12(3α3S(αT − 6γS −
10
γT )+2α
2
S(5α
2
T +9γ
2
S +6γSγT +5γ
2
T −2αT (3γS +5γT ))+αS(3α3T −α2T (11 γS +15γT )−γT (3γ2S +10γSγT +
3γ2T )+αT (9γ
2
S +56γSγT +15γ
2
T ))+αT (−2γT (γS +3γT )2−3α2T (γS +6γT )+αT (γ2S +15γSγT +36γ2T )))]/G,
pTS∗2A = (84tC + (−4α2S − 16αSαT − 12α2T + 38αSγS + 2αT γS − 21γ2S + 22αSγT + 42αT γT − 2γSγT −
9γ2T + 18tC(17αS − 3αT + 19γS + 9γT ))− 3(8α2S(αT − 6γS − γT ) + (3γS + γT ) (γS + 3γT )2 + 6α2T (5γS +
3γT ) + 2αS(12α
2
T + 5αT γS − 27γ2S − 21αT γT − 14γSγT + 9γ2T )− αT (19γ2S + 66γSγT + 27γ2T )))/G,
where G = 3(420tC − 54α2S − 54α2T + 53αT γS − 54γ2S + 207αT γT − 52γSγT − 54γ2T + αS(−52αT +
207γS + 53γT )).
We can obtain platforms’ profits by plugging in these optimal prices. Clearly, SS is the equilibrium when
ΠSS∗i > Π
TS∗
i and Π
ST∗
i > Π
TT∗
i . Similarly, TT is the equilibrium when Π
TT∗
i > Π
ST∗
i and Π
TS∗
i > Π
SS∗
i .
B Additional Analyses
B.1 Analysis of Monopoly
When the monopoly platform offers traditional ads, we assume that markets for both consumers and
advertisers are incompletely covered. In this case, the platform’s demand from consumers and advertisers
is given by (superscript e denotes the expected value),
xTC =
u0 − pTC − γTxeTA
tC
∈ (0, 1), (13)
xTA =
αTx
eT
C − pTA
tA
∈ (0, 1). (14)
As in the main model, we assume tA = 1. Given consumers’ disutility from seeing the ads, their
demand decreases in the externality parameter γT and their expected number of ads on the platform, x
eT
A .
By contrast, given advertisers’ utility from reaching consumers, their demand increases in the externality
parameter αT and their expected number of consumers on the platform, x
eT
C . The platform’s profit is then
given by ΠT = pTCx
T
C + p
T
Ax
T
A. We assume that both consumers and advertisers have rational expectations:
xTC = x
eT
C and x
T
A = x
eT
A . Solving the platform’s optimization problem, we obtain the following prices,
demand and profits when the platform offers traditional ads.
pT∗C =
2tCu0 − u0αT (αT − γT )
4tC − (αT − γT )2 , (15)
pT∗A =
u0(αT + γT )
4tC − (αT − γT )2 , (16)
xT∗C =
2u0
4tC − (αT − γT )2 , (17)
xT∗A =
u0(αT − γT )
4tC − (αT − γT )2 , (18)
ΠT∗ =
u20
4tC − (αT − γT )2 . (19)
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Next, we analyze the optimal strategies for the monopoly platform when it offers sponsored content
ads. Similarly, we assume that markets for consumers and advertisers are incompletely covered. In this
case, consumers’ utility is given by u0 + uS − tCxSC − pSC − γSxeSA , and advertisers’ utility is given by
αSx
eS
C − xSA − pSA. Therefore, the platform’s demand from consumers and advertisers are given by,
xSC =
u0 + uS − pSC − γSxeSA
tC
∈ (0, 1), (20)
xSA = αSx
eS
C − pSA ∈ (0, 1). (21)
The platform’s profit is given by ΠS = pSCx
S
C +p
S
Ax
S
A. Given our assumptions on rational expectations,
we again have xSC = x
eS
C , and x
S
A = x
eS
A . Solving the platform’s optimization problem, we obtain the
following prices, demand and profits when the platform offers sponsored content ads.
pS∗C =
2tC(u0 + uS)− (u0 + uS)αS(αS − γS)
4tC − (αS − γS)2 , (22)
pS∗A =
(u0 + uS)(αS + γS)
4tC − (αS − γS)2 , (23)
xS∗C =
2(u0 + uS)
4tC − (αS − γS)2 , (24)
xS∗A =
(u0 + uS)(αS − γS)
4tC − (αS − γS)2 , (25)
ΠS∗ =
(u0 + uS)
2
4tC − (αS − γS)2 . (26)
Comparing the platform’s profits with the two different ad formats, we see that if the externality
parameters in both cases are identical (i.e., αS = αT , γS = γT ), then for any uS > 0, offering sponsored
content ads is the strictly dominant equilibrium strategy. Similarly, for any uS < 0, offering traditional
ads is the strictly dominant equilibrium strategy.
When the externality parameters are different and uS = 0, then offering sponsored content ads would
be a strictly dominant strategy as long as (γS − γT ) < (αS − αT ).
B.2 Free Content for Consumers
We already know that consumers’ equilibrium price from sponsored content advertising is pSS∗iC = tC −αS .
When αS > tC , the media content is free for the consumers. We assume that αT is also greater than tC , so
that regardless of the ad format, the media content is always free for the consumers. As a result, platforms’
revenues now only depend on the revenues from the advertisers’ side: Πi = p
vw
iA x
vw
iA .
When both platforms offer sponsored content ads, we obtain the following prices, demands and profit
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functions after solving the platforms’ optimization problems.
pSS∗iC = 0, (27)
pSS∗iA = 1 +
αSγS
tC
, (28)
xSS∗iC =
1
2
= xSS∗iA , (29)
ΠSS∗i =
1
2
(1 +
αSγS
tC
). (30)
The prices, demand and profit functions from the case of TT are symmetric and given as follows,
pTT∗iC = 0, p
TT∗
iA = 1 +
αT γT
tC
, xTT∗iC = x
TT∗
iA =
1
2 , and Π
TT∗
i =
1
2 (1 +
αT γT
tC
).
The prices, demand and profit functions from the case of TS/ST are as follows,
pTS∗1C = 0, p
TS∗
1A =
tC(6− αS + αT ) + (αS + αT )(2γS + γT )
6tC
, (31)
pTS∗2C = 0, p
TS∗
2A =
tC(6 + αS − αT ) + (αS + αT )(γS + 2γT )
6tC
, (32)
xTS∗1C =
12t2C + (αS + αT )(γS − γT )(γS + γT ) + 2tC((3 + 2αS + αT )γS − (3− 2αS − αT )γT )
6tC(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
, (33)
xTS∗2C =
12t2C − (αS + αT )(γS − γT )(γS + γT ) + 2tC((3 + αS + 2αT )γT − (3− αS − 2αT )γS)
6tC(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
, (34)
xTS∗1A =
tC(6− αS + αT ) + (αS + αT )(2γS + γT )
3(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
, (35)
xTS∗2A =
tC(6 + αS − αT ) + (αS + αT )(γS + 2γT )
3(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
, (36)
ΠTS∗1 =
(tC(6− αS + αT ) + (αS + αT )(2γS + γT ))2
18tC(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
, (37)
ΠTS∗2 =
(tC(6 + αS − αT ) + (αS + αT )(γS + 2γT ))2
18tC(4tC + (αS + αT )(γS + γT ))
. (38)
We see that the biggest change of results comes in terms of the effect of an increase in αS on platforms’
profits with sponsored content advertising. Now, as αS increases, so do the profits (from sponsored content
ads) of the platforms. Since the consumers do not pay any price, an increase in αS does not reduce
consumers’ price. As a result, the only effect of an increase in αS is an increase in advertisers’ price which
in turn increases platforms’ profits (recall that when the content is not free for the consumers, αS does not
affect advertisers’ price). Furthermore, as long as αSγS > αT γT (which always holds under the assumption
αS > αT and γS > γT ), advertisers pay a higher price and platforms earn greater profits under sponsored
content ads compared to that under traditional ads. The equilibrium conditions can be easily obtained by
comparing the profit differences across different subgames.
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B.3 The Case with No Ads
In the main text, we assumed that each platform displays either the traditional ads or the sponsored
content ads. In this extension, we analyze the situation where the platforms do not offer either type of
ads. In particular, the two competing platforms trade off between choosing the sponsored content ads and
the no ads strategy (denoted by N).
When neither platform offers any ad, they compete only in the consumer market. Their profits are
given by ΠNNi = p
NN
iC x
NN
iC . The optimal prices and profits are given as follows:
pNN∗1C = p
NN∗
2C = tC , Π
NN∗
1 = Π
NN∗
2 =
tC
2
.
When both platforms offer the sponsored content ads, they compete in both sides of the market. Their
profit functions are given by ΠSSi = p
SS
iC x
SS
iC + p
SS
iA x
SS
iA . The optimal prices and profits are given as follows:
pSS∗1C = p
SS∗
2C = tC − αS , pSS∗1A = pSS∗1A = 1 + γS , ΠSS∗1 = ΠSS∗2 =
1 + tC − αS + γS
2
.
When one platform (e.g., platform 1) offers the sponsored content ads and the other platform (e.g.,
platform 2) offers no ads, they compete in the consumer market. At the same time, the platform offering
the sponsored content ads acts as a monopoly in the advertising market. The two platforms’ profits are
given by ΠSN1 = p
SN
1C x
SN
1C + p
SN
1A x
SN
1A and Π
SN
2 = p
SN
2C x
SN
2C . The optimal prices and profits are given below:
pSN∗1C =
(3tC + αSγS)(4tC + αSγS − α2S)
12tC + 4αSγS − α2S − γ2S
,
pSN∗2C =
(6tC − (αS − γS)2)(2tC + αSγS)
12tC + 4αSγS − α2S − γ2S
,
pSN∗1A =
(αS + γS)(3tC + αSγS)
12tC + 4αSγS − α2S − γ2S
,
ΠSN∗1 =
(8tC − (αS − γS)2)(3tC + αSγS)2
(12tC + 4αSγS − α2S − γ2S)2
,
ΠSN∗2 =
(2tC + αSγS)(6tC − (αS − γS)2)2
(12tC + 4αSγS − α2S − γ2S)2
.
Clearly, when ΠSS∗1 ≥ ΠNS∗1 and ΠSN∗1 ≥ ΠNN∗1 , both platforms prefer to offer the sponsored content
ads, and SS is the dominant outcome. Similarly, we can analyze the competing platforms’ trade-off between
offering the traditional ads and no ads. When the following conditions are satisfied, NN (neither platform
offering any ad) is never going to be the equilibrium:
(1 + tC − αv + γv)(12tC + 4αvγv − α2v − γ2v)2 − 2(2tC + αvγv)(6tC − (αv − γv)2)2 > 0,
2(8tC − (αv − γv)2)(3tC + αvγv)2 − tC(12tC + 4αvγv − α2v)2 > 0, v ∈ {S, T}.
In other words, NN is dominated by SS or TT when these conditions are satisfied.
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